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I. INTRODUCTION
The entities that provide Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) ser-
vices for a specific class of disputes within a defined dispute resolution
framework are often studied by comparing them to the courts. But there
are very few, and no thorough, empirical studies that compare ADR ser-
vice providers' performance and study the market for private dispute
resolution services.
In the past few years, the number of Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) systems has increased dramatically. This is especially due to the
Internet furthering the use of new communication technologies for pro-
viding arbitration services.' Much of the increase in ADR regimes is also
a result of the passage of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998,
legislation that promoted and authorized the use of ADR providers in the
United States.2
Generally, ADR regimes function as an alternative to the courts for
resolving different conflicts.3 The range and scope of activities and is-
1. "Informal rulemaking, "one of the greatest inventions of modem government," is
about to be transformed by the silent revolution of e-govemment, the widespread incorpora-
tion of Web-based technology in the public sector. Whether the revolution is a boon or a bust
for democracy will depend on whether that technology is designed to strengthen the right of
citizens to participate in making administrative rules." Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic
Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 433 (2004).
"Where offline ADR may help to settle a matter in days or months, as compared to the
years it may take to resolved litigation, online ADR promises settlement of disputes within
days or even hours. The borderless nature of the Internet diminishes the communication prob-
lems faced by parties located in different time zones" Aashit Shah, Using ADR to Resolve
Online Disputes, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25, *21 (2004).
2. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 651-58 (2000).
3. "The growth of ADR is based on the recognition that there are many ways to re-
solve disputes, limited only by the parties creativity and willingness to innovate. Parties
involved in disputes, their attorneys, mediators and arbitrators should continuously investigate,
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sues resolved through ADR is growing fast and includes diverse fields
like labor, health services, e-commerce, domain names, and similar pur-
suits.4 As such, there are many reasons why ADR is advantageous as
compared with the courts First, ADR is faster than the courts and pro-
vides quick relief for a diverse set of issues.6 Second, ADR tends to have
simple procedural rules that parties can easily understand.7 Third, and
closely related to the other two characteristics, ADR is relatively inex-
pensive and provides valuable dispute resolution services for
consumers.8 As a result, there is a proliferation of different ADR provid-
ers in many economic sectors. 9
There are, however, many commentators and scholars who complain
about the actual effectiveness of ADR regimes.'0 Most of the critics focus
on the lack of certain characteristics in ADR systems that are key to pro-
ducing impartial and accurate judgments. First, the appointment and
availability of panelists or arbitrators is limited and controlled by the
discuss and implement innovative procedures that will lead to a fair, efficient and effective
resolution of disputes." Robert J. Macpherson, Richard F Smith and Roy S. Mitchell, Innova-
tions in Arbitration: Improving the Presentation of Evidence in Constructing Arbitration, 58
Disp. RES. J. 30, 34 (2003).
4. See, Mitchell J. Nathanson, It's the Economy (and Combined Ratio), Stupid: Exam-
ining the Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to Reform, 108
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1077 (2004); Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation of Ameri-
can Labor Unions, 69 Mo. L. REv. 365 (2004); J. Clarence Davies, Environmental ADR and
Public Participation, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 389 (2000); Phyllis E. Bernard, Mediating with an
800-pound Gorilla: Medicare and ADR, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1417 (2003); Michael Z.
Green, Opposing Excessive Use of Employer Bargaining Power in Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements Through Collective Employee Actions, 10 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 77 (2003);
Ayelet Lichtash, Inappropriate Use of E-mail and the Internet in the Workplace: The Arbitra-
tion Picture, 59 APR Disp. RESOL. J. 26 (2004); Michael L. Rustad, Punitive Damages in
Cyberspace: Where in the World is the Consumer? 7 CHAP. L. REV. 39 (2004); Aashit Shah,
supra note 1 (addressing issues concerning ADR in different economic sectors).
5. See Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Services by
Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 715 (1999); Lucille M.
Ponte, Boosting Consumer Confidence in E-Business: Recommendations for Establishing Fair
and Effective Dispute Resolution Programs for B2C Online Transactions, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. &
TECH. 441 (2002); Rex R. Perschbacher and Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 1 (2004) (analyzing the effectiveness of ADR regimes).
6. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
7. See generally Perschbacher and Bassett, supra note 5.
8. "Alternative dispute resolution methods can mitigate the problem of the high cost of
litigation. Indeed, its ability to reduce dispute resolution costs is generally regarded as one of
the chief benefits of ADR. Because ADR costs less than traditional dispute resolution, it is
more accessible for the parties involved." Nathan K. DeDino, Note, When Fences Aren't
Enough: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution To Resolve Disputes Between Neighbors,
18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 887, 893 (2003).
9. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
10. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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ADR provider." Second, procedures are usually private. Third, some-
times ADR systems do not provide for an effective appeal of their
rulings.'3 Fourth, ADR systems concentrate on specific types of cases,
such as labor issues. Such a repetition of the same kind of cases, and also
the same parties, creates problems of independence and objective analy-
sis of each case. Finally, ADR systems are usually private, and their
stakeholders can have a close relationship with the groups that have an
interest in the services provided by the ADR entities. For example, in the
case of Trust-e, the companies that supported and created the ADR re-
gime for the protection of online privacy were also using the same
system to enter consumer complaints that needed resolution. 4
Despite the interest in the performance of different ADR providers,
most of the literature concentrates on the analysis of the main character-
istics of these systems as compared to the courts.'5 Nonetheless, within
the world of private dispute resolution, we should naturally observe dif-
ferences in performance among these private providers. However,
literature has addressed neither the effects of this competition nor the
consistency and uniformity across ADR providers.
We present a thorough analysis of one of the ADR regimes that is
considered a significant success in Internet markets, the Uniform Dis-
11. "Another, related dimension of the arbitration that should be addressed in the arbi-
tration agreement is which entity should have controlling authority in the proceeding: the
administering arbitral institution, the arbitrating parties, or the arbitrators. Traditionally, prac-
tice provides the basic guidance on this matter following the rule that "unless the parties
provide otherwise, the arbitrators shall decide .. " This pragmatic balance between freedom
of contract and the authority of the arbitrators has been, and may continue to be, a sufficient
hierarchy of authority. In circumstances in which irreconcilable positions develop between the
three principal players in the process, however, such as those pertaining to the matter of im-
partiality, the well-settled hierarchy may be inadequate to resolve the conflict. Party provisions
in these circumstances would at least emphasize the importance and argue for the controlling
authority of contract in the resolution of these conflicts. Courts may not support, and arbitral
institutions may not yield, to that principle of determination." Thomas E. Carbonneau, The
Exercise Of Contract Freedom In The Making Of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1189, 1217 (2003).
12. See Perschbacher and Bassett supra note 5 (analyzing the differences between arbi-
tration and courts).
13. "The lack of appeal from arbitration is another way to challenge mandatory refer-
ence to binding arbitration. Since the legal grounds to challenge are very demanding, with a
strong presumption in favor of the arbitrator's decision, the lack of appeal can appear to be
another hindrance to rights enforcement. Arbitrators' decisions have long been thought to
contain compromises of one sort or another." Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System:
From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 927, 935 (2002).
14. See Trust-e at http://www.truste.org (showing that most of the sponsors and foun-
ders of the Seal are also users).
15. See supra notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
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pute Resolution Policy (UDRP) implemented by the Internet Corpora-
tion for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).'6 In this work, we
perform a complete empirical analysis of the UDRP and evaluate its per-
formance. We then extrapolate the results to other sectors of the Internet
market and to private dispute resolution in general.
The impressive growth of the Internet in the 1990s and the boom of
the e-economy generated competition for the most coveted of the top
domain names, i.e., the .com. 7 Nonetheless, the other original generic
top level domain names (gTLDs) open to commercial use, .org and .net,
were also in high demand from businesses. Other types of top-level
domain names, especially the country code TLDs (ccTLDs), were of
little commercial value, and registration was not as important as it was
with gTLDs.' 9 As a result, the artificial scarcity of TLDs created by the
managers of the Domain Name System (DNS) sharply increased the
value of the registered and most popular domain names. Although a new
set of gTLDs were recently introduced in the root system, ° the .com
16. This type of ADR regime has also been proposed for other Internet activities such
as electronic commerce, business relationships, and the like.
17. "... .[T]he 'Webification' of domain names was the critical step in the endowment of
the name space with economic value. It massively increased the demand for domain name
registrations and game common, or famous, or generic terms under the .com space the com-
mercially valuable property of being able to effortlessly deliver thousands if not millions of
Web site "hits"." MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT. INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE
TAMING OF CYBERSPACE, 109 (2002).
"The e-commerce explosion of the late 20th Century has created a rush on Internet do-
main names. More domain names are being registered, and there are more registrars to do it
than ever before. In fact, the Internet may be running out of space. In the most popular top
level domain, <.con>, it seems that almost every recognizable word has been claimed." Kevin
Heller, The Young Cybersquatter's Handbook: A Comparative Analysis of the ICANN Dispute,
2 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 2, 2 (2001).
18. "Other gTLDs in existence since 1984 impose additional criteria for registration:
.mil (U.S. military), .gov (U.S. government), .int (international organizations), .edu (institu-
tions of higher education, mostly U.S. based), and .arpa. In November 2000, following a
complex and convoluted process, ICANN approved in principle the creation of seven new
gTLDs." A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy" Causes and
(Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 618 (2002).
"Domain names have become the valuable intangible real estate of cyberspace. For ex-
ample, the domain name sex.com was valued at $250 million; business.com at $7.5 million;
and loan.com at $3.0 million. The monetary value of some domain names suggests that it
would be proper to classify domain names as property." Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Cyberprop-
erty and Judicial Dissonance: The Trouble with Domain Name Classification, 10 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 183, 184-85 (2001).
19. See Froomkin, supra note 18, at 618.
20. "Among the most significant events in the domain name world is the addition of
seven new generic top level domain names ("gtlds"): .aero; .biz; .coop; .info; .museum; .name;
and pro. The .info name like .com before it, is unrestricted and anyone will be able to register
Spring 2005]
290 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 11:285
domain names are still the most important for e-commerce. Initially,
Network Solutions Inc. (NSI), a private for-profit firm, through a special
contract with the United States government, managed the domain name
system.' Later, in 1995, NSI delineated a policy for conflict resolution
of domain names without creating an authority to solve disputes.2 The
result was that the management of numerical addresses in the Internet
was under the charge of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA).23
In 1997, because of the expansion of the Internet internationally, the
United States government delegated the management of numbers and
names on the Internet to a non-profit corporation based in California, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
24
and use. it. The other domain names have restricted uses." Barbara Solomon, Domain Name
Disputes: New Developments and Open Issues, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 833, 833 (2001).
21. "NSI agreed to register second-level domains in .com, .net, org and .edu and to
maintain those top-level domains' master databases. These services were underwritten by the
National Science Foundation and were free to users initially. As the number of registrations
began to rise, NSI and the National Science Foundation agreed that NSF would no longer
underwrite these services. Instead, NSI would charge a fifty dollar (US $50) annual fee to
each domain name registrant." Wayde Brooks, Wrestling Over the World Wide Web: ICANN's
Uniform dispute Resolution Policy for Domain Names Disputes, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL'v 297, 311-312 (2001).
22. "In July 1995, Network Solutions issued a "Domain Dispute Resolution Policy
Statement" designed to shield itself from future trademark-related lawsuits. In this policy
statement, Network Solutions declared that it "has neither the legal resources nor the legal
obligation to screen requested Domain Names to determine if the use of a Domain Name by
an Applicant may infringe upon the right(s) of a third party." It then set out a series of contrac-
tual conditions that would be imposed on all registrants in the InterNIC-operated domains.
The policy gave Network Solutions the right to withdraw a domain name from use if presented
with a court order from an arbitration panel decision transferring the name." MUELLER, supra
note 17, at 120-121.
"To invoke the NSI Dispute Policy, the complainant would have to give notice to the reg-
istrant that there had been an alleged trademark violation because the "creation date" of the
registrant's domain name registration followed the "effective date" of the complainant's regis-
tration of an identical trademark. After NSI received a copy of the complaint, the registrant
would have thirty days to prove that he owned a trademark in the contested name. If he could
not, NSI would put the domain name on "hold" until a resolution was reached, either between
the parties or through litigation." Keith Blackman, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Reso-
lution Policy: A Cheaper Way to Hijack Domain Names and Suppress Critics, 15 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 211, 222 (2001).
23. "RFC 1083 (December 1988), which defined a standards-making process for the
new, extended Internet community, was also the first public document to mention an Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (LANA)." MUELLER, supra note 17, at 93 (describing the crea-
tion and characteristics of JANA).
24. See MUELLER, supra note 17, Chapter 8 (describing the political process that re-
sulted in the creation of ICANN in 1997).
"In the White Paper that emerged from the convoluted U.S. government policy process-
formally known as the U.S. Department of Commerce's Statement of Policy on Management
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From 1997 on, ICANN was in charge of managing the names and num-
bers system for the Internet.25 Even though ICANN is the most important
organization managing domain names, it is not the only one. There are
other alternative root servers: Open NIC, ORSC, Pacific Root, New.net,
Name.space, and CN-NIC. 26 The relevance and power of ICANN to im-
plement new policies for the Internet is based on two main
characteristics: (1) the monopoly of the main Domain Name system in
the Internet; and (2) the lack of technological compatibility between
competing Domain Name systems, preventing other private firms from
competing with ICANN.27
One of the main problems in the medium term was the creation of a
system to handle the growing number of conflicts among users caused
by the sometimes indiscriminate registration of domain names that col-
lided with already established trademarks in the real life markets." These
disputes grew in direct proportion to the increase in Internet commerce
of Internet Names and Addresses- the government took something of a middle-of-the-road
position. It agreed that trademark owners were being victimized by so-called cyberpirates who
registered domain names to sell them to the corresponding trademark holder. But rather than
proposing direct action, the White Paper called on WIPO to conduct a study and make rec-
ommendations for what would become ICANN." Froomkin, supra note 18, at 622-623.
25. "In furtherance of the foregoing purposes, and in recognition of the fact that the
Internet is an international network of networks, owned by no single nation, individual or
organization, the Corporation shall, except as limited by Article 5 hereof, pursue the charitable
and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public
interest in the operational stability of the Internet by (i)coordinating the assignment of Internet
technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet; (ii) perform-
ing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet Protocol ("IP") address
space; (iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet
domain name system ("DNS"), including the development of policies for determining the
circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to the DNS root system; (iv)
overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet DNS root server system; and (v) engaging in
any other related lawful activity in furtherance of items (i) through (iv)*" Articles of Incorpora-
tion of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, November 1998, at
http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm
26. See MUELLER, supra note 17, at 55 (describing the other root servers of the Internet
and the problems of compatibility between them).
27. Id.
28. "Unfortunately for these businesses, registration of SLDs in the three existent
gTLDs (.com, .org and .net) and in the ccTLDs which emulate them, is on a first-come, first-
served basis. No questions are asked about the proposed use, or about possible trademark
conflicts.... As there was no limit to the number of names a person could register, name
speculators quickly understood that they could register names and seek buyers for them with-
out risking any capital. While some speculators sought common words with multiple possible
uses, a few others-who became known as cybersquatters- registered thousands of names that
corresponded to the trademarks or companies that had not yet found the Internet and then
sought to resell (or, some would say, ransom) the name to those companies." Froomkin, supra
note 18, at 620.
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in the late 1990s. 29 In fact, instead of decreasing the pressure on the use
of the .com by creating other kinds of top domain names, ICANN alleg-
edly created an artificial scarcity in this environment and drove up the
demand for use of the already fully utilized .com.3 ° The usual mechanism
,to solve these kinds of disputes, court, had difficulty handling cases
where parties came from different jurisdictions and had different rights
under the law. And even though the courts reached verdicts, the en-
forcement of those verdicts was typically weak, if it was available at
all.3 Furthermore, typical judicial remedies were too slow and expensive
to adequately resolve Internet domain name disputes.32
One of the main tasks of ICANN, in accordance with the mandate
received through the delegation of power from the United States gov-
ernment, was to provide a fast and inexpensive system to solve domain
29. "Whether the actual magnitude of the overall "cyber-piracy" problem was .045% or
3.5% of new registrations, or more likely somewhere in between, and whether the problem
was growing or shrinking, in absolute terms, it clearly existed." Froomkin, supra note 18, at
627.
30. See Heller, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Even though there were just three gTLDs open to general public, LANA registered more
than 200 applications until 1996. See MUELLER, supra note 17, at 132-133.
31. "The global reach of the Internet provides both the Internet's appeal and many of
the legal problems being encountered. Activity on the web that may be permissible where
initiated may violate the law in the locale where the web site is accessed. Until recently there
was no easy way to confine modifications to a web site or domain name to a particular geo-
graphic area. Thus, any changes that were made or imposed by a court became global in effect
even when made in response to local laws or requirements." Solomon, supra note 20, at 859.
"Many of these multijurisdictional disputes raise exactly the kinds of issues typically
found in U.S. litigation involving citizens of more than one state, such as differences in sub-
stantive law, procedural rules, and choice of law rules. As the disputes move from interstate to
international, the differences and practical difficulties increase. Difference in substantial law
may be more substantial, differences in procedural rules more significant, differences in the
ability to acquire jurisdiction more diverse, and differences in choice of law rules more com-
plex. Also, multinational disputes can add a layer of enforcement difficulties." Elizabeth
Thomburg, Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution
Process, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 191, 192-193 (2002).
See Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L REV. 1275
(2002) (analyzing the problems of the courts in handling cases related to the Internet).
32. "Notwithstanding the size of the individual settlements, firms managing large num-
ber of brands argued that the cumulative costs imposed an unfair burden and amounted to a
windfall to the undeserving. Worse, aggrieved trademark holders in countries with dysfunc-
tional court systems stated that their national court systems were so slow as to make the wait
for meaningful relief against improper domain name registrations an eternity in Internet time,
or even in ordinary time. Other trademark holders complained of the difficulty of locating
cybersquatters who falsified their contact information at the time of registration, or who were
located in jurisdictions where the law was uncertain, the courts unreliable, or service was
difficult." Froomkin, supra note 18, at 629.
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name disputes.33 In 1999, after a series of consultations with many inter-
est groups, ICANN created the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP)." The UDRP was a decentralized regime for dispute resolution
in which ICANN created the general rules and authorized a series of
competing private providers to manage and resolve disputes. ICANN,
because of its role as the only manager of the domain name system, al-
most perfected enforcement of the providers' decisions.35 Nonetheless,
after a few years, scholars and commentators harshly criticized ICANN.
Overall, the debate on the performance of the system has been strong,
with both unfavorable and a few favorable comments.36
33. "The U.S. Government will seek international support to call upon the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO) to initiate a balanced and transparent process, which
includes the participation of trademark holders and members of the Internet community who
are not trademark holders, to (1) develop recommendations for a uniform approach to resolv-
ing trademark/domain name disputes involving cyberpiracy (as opposed to conflicts between
trademark holders with legitimate competing rights), (2) recommend a process for protecting
famous trademarks in the generic top level domains, and (3) evaluate the effects, based on
studies conducted by independent organizations, such as the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences, of adding new gTLDs and related dispute resolution proce-
dures on trademark and intellectual property holders. These findings and recommendations
could be submitted to the board of the new corporation for its consideration in conjunction
with its development of registry and registrar policy and the creation and introduction of new
gTLDs." United States Department of Commerce, Management of Internet Names and Ad-
dresses, June 1998, at http://www.icann.org/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm
34. "The UDRP was adopted to provide a relatively fast and effective means of dealing
with the issues of bad faith domain name registration. Currently, the UDRP applies to the
.com, .net, and .org gtlds and top sixteen cctlds. Moreover, there is a push for all cctld regis-
trars to adopt a policy modeled on the UDRP. If all domain registrars were to adopt the same
policy, a complainant could bring a consolidated action concerning objectionable domain
names in both gtlds and cctlds. WIPO has received four such cases." Solomon, supra note 20,
at 835.
35. "Under the UDRP, jurisdiction is contractual. The UDRP is incorporated into every
domain name Registration Agreement. By registering a domain name with any accredited
registrar, if any third party alleges cybersquatting, respondent subjects himself to the UDRP's
mandatory administrative procedure which is in procedural compliance with the Rules."
Heller, supra note 17, at 4.
36. There is a wide range of critics and some support of the UDRP by ICANN. The
following is an incomplete list of some papers that deal with the problems and challenges of
the system: Laurence R. Heifer and Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems:
The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
141, 154-155 (2001); Thornburg, supra note 31; Patrick D. Kelley, Emerging Patterns inArbi-
tration Under the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
181 (2002); Adam Goldstein, Note, ICANNSUCKS.BIZ (And Why You Can't Say That): How
Fair Use of Trademarks in Domain Names is Being Restrained, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1151 (2002); Milton Mueller, A New Profile of Domain Name Trademark
Disputes under ICANN's UDRP, Syracuse University School of Information Studies Working
Paper, June 2002 (On file with the authors); Milton Mueller, supra note 17; Scott Hejny,
Comment, Opening the Door to Controversy: How Recent ICANN Decisions Have Muddied
the Waters of Domain Name Dispute Resolution, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1037 (2001); Keith
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The characteristics and facts of the disputes together with an analy-
sis of the results of panel decisions have provided the basis for most of
the empirical studies of the UDRP.37 Common criticisms are that the pro-
viders have incentives to favor the complainants and that the rules favor
Blackman, supra note 22; Pamela Segal, Attempts to Solve the UDRP's Trademark Holder
Bias: A Problem That Remains Unsolved Despite the Introduction of New Top Level Domain
Names, 3 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2001); Holger P. Hestermeyer, The Inva-
lidity of ICANN's UDRP Under National Law, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2002),
available athttp://mipr.umn.edu/archive/v3nllhestermeyer.pdf; Michael Geist, Fair.com? An
Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 903 (2002); Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000); Joe Sims and Cynthia Bauerly,
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proprietary interests in the Internet.38 Some of these perceived flaws may
stem from the political structure of ICANN.3 9
In this paper, we thoroughly critique the performance of the UDRP
providers and identify the main variables that determine ICANN's effi-
ciency. For example, one of the key variables, and also a main concern of
ICANN, is the duration of the procedure to decide these cases. We ana-
lyze the decisions of the complainants in deciding to send their claim to
a particular dispute resolution provider. Using a multinomial logit re-
gression model to determine if complainants select the provider based on
bias or the duration of the procedure, we show that duration is at least as
important as bias in selecting providers. This is a key finding because
our results show that the emphasis of other theoretical and empirical
work that has exclusively concentrated on the effects of bias is mis-
placed. Consequently, we recommend that more attention should be paid
to other performance and efficiency indicators, particularly the indicators
proposed in this paper. In our empirical analysis, we used the duration of
the cases as the variable to measure the general efficiency of each pro-
vider. Additionally, we applied regression models based on the analysis
of the system's duration to identify different factors that determine the
system's performance.
In studying the actual performance of providers, we have found that
the UDRP providers have different duration functions. Moreover, be-
cause there are different procedures, different review processes, and
different technologies used to handle these cases, forum shopping is very
likely to exist. This existence of forum shopping based on the perform-
ance of the providers is different from forum shopping based on the bias
of the provider towards the complainant.4 ' These results are supported
38. ".... [T]he procedural design of ICANN's UDRP has a number of special features
that resulted in an especially unjust set of outcomes. Key decisions were made by unrepresen-
tative groups or persons who were not subject to any democratic control, and the rules went in
effect because of ICANN's monopoly over technical aspect of the Internet, not because any
legislature approved them." Froomkin, supra note 18, at 712.
See Geist, supra note 36 and Thornburg, supra note 31 (analyzing the bias of the UDRP
providers that favored complainants).
39. Jay Kesan & Andres Gallo, ICANN Politics: Changes and Constituencies, draft
manuscript 2004 (on file with the authors).
40. "[Tlhe main advantage of using the UDRP over filing a lawsuit is that it can gener-
ally provide an inexpensive and quick resolution for domain name disputes. Because there is
no discovery process and no absolute right to file endless replies and subreplies after the initial
filing of the complaint and the response, the costs of a UDRP proceeding can be much less
than seeking a preliminary injunction in court. However, using the UDRP effectively requires
thorough advance preparation, investigation and research." Look, supra note 36, at 824-825.
41. See Froomkin, supra note 18.
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by: (1) the fact that the two most important domain name dispute resolu-
tion providers are located at the extremes of the possible technological
structures of the UDRP; and (2) the fact that the providers have an un-
ambiguous bias for specific countries. This finding is important because
most of the literature discussing provider bias focuses on bias between
particular individuals. In addition, the geographical bias towards the
countries of origin of the providers is important when analyzing the de-
sign of a general dispute system such as the UDRP. Additionally, the
evidence of such bias strongly contradicts ICANN's claim that the sys-
tem is intended to handle the most diverse claims involving the Internet,
regardless of the parties' origins.42
We also found that some panelists have a completely different dura-
tion function in deciding cases than the rest of the cases viewed
collectively under any private provider. That said, structural differences
among providers can influence the panelists' performance. Interestingly,
the fact that some panelists exhibit a different behavior from the rest of
the panelists within the same provider could be beneficial and providers
should give these panelists more cases to handle. At the same time, pan-
elists consistently favoring one party over another should be evaluated
carefully and should perhaps not handle as many cases. This evidence
calls into question the overall manner in which providers assign cases to
the panelists. In addition, we find that the evidence presented by com-
plainants and respondents affects the performance of the providers.
Finally, we evaluate the differences in performance between one and
three member panels. We find that three member panels are as efficient
as single member panels. Accordingly, changing to a general three mem-
ber panel system could promote fairness without creating a negative
impact on efficiency.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the ICANN-
UDRP system and the providers in charge of the dispute resolution proc-
ess. Second, we present a regression model to analyze the selection
process employed by the complainants in choosing a dispute resolution
provider. We also describe the regression technique used for the empiri-
42. "At the UDRP's inception, ICANN had three main objectives it sought to achieve.
The first goal was to create global uniformity. An example of this would be to eliminate com-
petition among jurisdictions-forum shopping-and rules that are applied to domain name
and trademark disputes. The second goal was to reduce the cost of resolving disputes. Finally,
the UDRP was intended to be heavily restricted in its applicability. It was supposed to be
geared toward the most flagrant types of cybersquatting, while other disputes would be left to
the courts." Pamela Segal, Attempts to Solve the UDRP's trademark Holder Bias: A Problem
That Remains Unsolved Despite the Introduction of New Top Level Domain Names, 3 CAR-
DOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 23 (2001).
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cal analysis and the characteristics of the database. Third, we present a
general empirical analysis of the UDRP system providers. Fourth, we
analyze the regression model and present the results from the model.
Fifth, we analyze the results in terms of the policy recommendations
derived from these results. Finally, we present our conclusions.
II. ICANN-UDRP CHARACTERISTICS
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) manages the IP address space allocation, protocol parameter
assignment, domain name system management, and root server system
management functions on the Internet." ICANN is a non-profit organiza-
tion created in 1998 by the Department of Commerce and supported by
various countries.' Among its various activities, the management of the
domain name system has proven to be a delicate area where property and
trademark rights from the real world collide with the unregulated aspects
of the Internet.4' Although trademark and property rights laws in differ-
ent countries could have protected new domain names assigned on the
Internet, there are many problems related to local courts' inability to
43. See http://www.icann.org/general/abouticann.htm. For history and development of
ICANN, see Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace, supra note 36; Michael Froomkin,
Habernas@Discourse.Net: Toward A Critical Theory Of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749
(January 2003); Edward C. Anderson and Timothy S. Cole, The UDRP-A Model for Dispute
Resolution in E-commerce? 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 235 (2002).
44. "Formed in October 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers (ICANN) is a non-profit, private-sector corporation formed by a broad coalition of the
Internet's business, technical, academic, and user communities. ICANN has been recognized
by the U.S. and other governments as the global consensus entity to coordinate the technical
management of the Internet's domain name system, the allocation of IP address space, the
assignment of protocol parameters, and the management of the root server system." See,
http://www.icann.org/general/fact-sheet.htm. "Prior to the formation of ICANN, administra-
tion of the authoritative list ultimately linking particular names and numbers (Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses) to specific computers was the responsibility of various departments of the U.S.
government and, later, Network Solutions Inc. (NSI), a for profit corporation operating under
contract with the U.S. Department of Commerce.... Objections to the monopoly over regis-
tration services held by NSI (and the U.S. government) led in 1998 to the creation of ICANN
and in particular ICANN's capacity to authorize multiple registrars to compete over registra-
tion services" Hadfield, supra note 36, at 259-260.
Many critics have said that ICANN received important power from the U.S. government,
which were reserved for the government instead of a private institution. See for example, Mi-
chael Froomkin, supra note 36 (claiming that the ICANN creation is not consistent with both
the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act). However, this is a highly debatable
topic, as can be seen in Brunet, supra note 36.
45. See Jay Kesan and Andres Gallo, Optimizing Internet Regulation, 72 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1497 (2004).
Spring 2005]
298 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 11:285
adequately handle Internet-based disputes. 6 As a result, conflicts over
the rights of domain names on the Internet generated a need for an arbi-
tration mechanism to resolve these disputes. 7
Private actors interested in creating an arbitration system and with
influence over ICANN, together with other organizations like the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), promoted the creation of a
dispute resolution mechanism for domain names. WIPO, in turn, pro-
duced a report for ICANN detailing the necessity of creating a dispute
resolution system and proposing specific rules for such a system.48 This
report was the blue print for the new regime created by ICANN 9
In 1999, ICANN enacted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Reso-
lution Policy (UDRP)5 ° The UDRP authorized a number of private third-
party institutions (Providers) to evaluate disputes among Internet users
regarding rights over domain names.' ICANN designed a series of gen-
eral rules to regulate the dispute resolution procedures, leaving the
private providers to add their own complementary rules to the system."
46. See Lee, supra note 31 (analyzing the problems courts have in dealing with Internet
related issues).
47. "Reconciling the competing interests of trademark owners and domain name regis-
trants has not proved an easy task, either nationally or internationally. The territorial nature of
trademark rights, the lack of a single body of rules governing trademark-domain name dis-
putes, the difficulty of locating registrants, and the possibility that different domain name
registrants own multiple iterations of a preexisting mark all make the prospect of litigating
before national courts protracted, expensive and perhaps even futile. Not surprisingly, trade-
mark owners have expressed interest in streamlined and inexpensive non-national dispute
settlement alternatives, particularly for disputes with a class of domain name registrants
known as cybersquatters." Helfer and Dinwoodie, supra note 36,at 154-155.
48. See http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (describing the timetable of crea-
tion of the UDRP with links to WIPO initiative). See Heifer and Dinwoodie, supra note 36
(describing the proposal of WIPO and the reforms introduced by ICANN when implementing
the system.)
49. See Froomkin, supra note 18 (describing the differences between WIPO proposal
and the final ICANN's UDRP.)
50. See Hefer and Dinwoodie, supra note 36. (describing the creation of the UDRP).
See also ICANN, Timeline for the Formulation and Implementation of the Uniform Domain-
Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm.
51. The approved providers are: World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
December 1st 1999, The National Forum Arbitration (NAF) December 23rd 1999, eResolu-
tions (eRes) January 1st 2000 (terminated November 30th 2001), CPR Institute for Dispute
Resolution (CPR) May 22nd 2000 and Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre
(ADNDRC) February 28th 2002. ICANN, Approved Providers for Uniform Domain-Name
Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm.
52. The two main instruments that regulate the system are the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) and the Rules for the Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution
Policy, both documents were approved on October 24th 1999. See, ICANN, Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policies, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/. Each provider can produce its own
rules in those areas not regulated by the Policy. For supplemental rules, see ICANN, Approved
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ICANN derives its ability to enforce and apply the UDRP regime to the
registered domain names from the contract each user enters into with
ICANN at the moment of registering a new domain name.53 In the fol-
lowing section, we describe the main characteristics of the UDRP system
and identify the weaknesses and strengths of this regime. We also de-
lineate the questions tested with our regression model.
A. Procedure and Enforcement
The general procedure for considering complaints is a competitive
one in which different organizations are able to offer dispute resolution
services to users. ' This process is different from the other typical alter-
native dispute resolution regimes such as those used to resolve disputes
over privacy rights. In alternative dispute resolution regimes, the choice
of private provider is imposed by the individual web site that is visited."
In the UDRP system, Internet users can choose the provider knowing
that the underlying set of rules is uniform. However, by letting the com-
plainant choose the provider, ICANN has created an incentive for
providers to favor complainants in their decisions.56
Providers for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/
dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm.
53. "When ICANN licenses a registrar to offer a .com, net, org, .info, .biz, or shortly,
.name second-level domains, that registrar agrees to incorporate the UDRP into its agreement
with the registrant; therefore, all domain names in those TLD's are subject to its terms." Gold-
stein, supra note 36, at 1161.
"One can see the superficial appeal of an ICANN-like process to resolve international
Internet disputes. First, it applies globally.... This eliminates the tricky issue of personal
jurisdiction over the domain name holder. It also manages to create a contractually mandated
private system for the benefit of noncontracting parties. Second, because the process does not
require (or even allow) personal appearances by the parties, it minimizes geographic distance
problems.... Third, the UDRP attempts to overcome the choice of the law problems raised by
differences in national trademark laws by creating its own "law" in the ICANN Policy. Finally,
because ICANN has a contract with the company that controls the root server that assigns
domain names, it has the power to enforce the arbitrators' decisions without the need to ask a
court to enforce the judgment." Thornburg, supra note 31 ,at 196.
54. The two main instruments that regulate the system are the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) and the Rules for the Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution
Policy, both documents approved in October 24th 1999. See, ICANN, Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policies, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/. Each provider can produce its own rules in
those areas not regulated by the Policy. For supplemental rules, see ICANN, Approved Provid-
ersfor Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/
approved-providers.htm.
55. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 45 (analyzing the efficiency of top-down and bot-
tom-up regulation for privacy rights in e-commerce).
56. See Giest, supra note 36, and Froomkin, supra note 18 (analyzing the bias of the
UDRP providers with respect to complainants).
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ICANN provides a set of rules that delimits the regulated issues, the
cases in which providers should evaluate penalties, and the minimum
requirements for the panel's composition.57 ICANN also allows providers
freedom to implement further rules and to charge the corresponding
fees.58 This framework has both created good incentives for competition
among providers of domain name dispute resolution services offered at
reasonably low cost5 9 and generated problems of bias favoring complain-
ants.6° The complaints evaluated under the UDRP are only those related
to domain name disputes.6' In summary, the current system favors pro-
viders who are friendly to complainants, and the providers' optimal
strategy is to favor complainants in order to ensure that they continue to
be chosen in the future.62
57. See ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://www.
icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (listing the policy rules). See Appendix A for a list of the main
requirements for the disputes to be considered valid. For an analysis of the policy see Michael
Froomkin supra note 18.
58. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
59. "Considering that the filling fee for a dispute involving a single domain name,
heard by a single panelist, can be as low as $1,150. The UDRP is an attractive alternative to
protracted litigation. While there are several factors that contribute to the low cost of a UDRP
proceeding, the primary reason is the simplicity of the process. The administrative panel is
limited to considering the written submissions made by the parties. The UDRP does not pro-
vide for discovery or submission of interrogatories by the parties, elements that typically
increase the cost of other processes, in both time and money." Anderson and Cole, supra note
43, at 249.
60. "This study provides compelling evidence that forum shopping has become an
integral part of the UDRP and that the system may indeed be biased in favor of trademark
holders. Both WIPO and NAF, the two dominant ICANN accredited arbitration providers,
feature case allocation that suggests that the panelist selection process is not random. Rather,
it appears to be heavily biased toward ensuring that a majority of cases are steered toward
complainant friendly panelists. Moreover, the data shows that there is a correlation between
the provider panelist selection and case outcome. When providers control who decides a case,
as they do for all single panel cases, complainants win just over 83% of the time. As provider
influence over panelists diminishes, as occurs in three-member panel cases, the complainant
winning percentage drops to 60%." Geist, supra note 36, at 936.
61. "All other disputes between you and any party other than us regarding your domain
name registration that are not brought pursuant to the mandatory administrative proceeding
provisions of Paragraph 4 shall be resolved between you and such other party through any
court, arbitration or other proceeding that may be available." UDRP part 5, at http://www.
icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.
62. It is interesting to notice that the only provider that declared bankruptcy was e-
Resolution, which was the one with more cases won by respondents.
"Rather than both sides having equal input into who will decide the case, the complain-
ant chooses the arbitral tribunal from a small list of approved providers maintained by
ICANN. Unlike standard arbitration clauses where the provider is specified in the presumably
bargained-for contract or negotiated by the parties at the time of the dispute, the respondent
has no say in which provider will manage her case, and no peremptory challenges to arbitra-
tors she may fear are biased. The respondent can, however, pick one member of a three-person
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Figure 1 shows the different stages the claim goes through during the
procedure. These stages can vary marginally because of the providers'
different supplemental rules. The complainant can file a complaint with
any of the approved providers that ICANN has authorized.63 Once the
provider receives the complaint, the provider has to evaluate the com-
plaint's validity. If the complaint is not valid, then the provider could
either ask for further information or discard the complaint. If the com-
plaint is valid, then the case must be resolved by the provider who asks
the respondent to submit a defense responding to the complaint. Once
the respondent has submitted an answer, or the respondent is declared in
default, the provider forms a panel. This panel can be either a one or a
three-member panel, depending on the request of the parties.6' In contrast
panel at her own expense if the complainant opted for a single panelist and the respondent
decides three are needed. Overall, the system gives dispute resolution providers an economic
incentive to compete by being complainant-friendly." Froomkin, supra note 18, at 671-672.
63. See Appendix A for a graphic description of complaints procedure.
64. According with the UDRP the panel is formed as follows:
APPOINTMENT OF THE PANEL AND TIMING OF DECISION
(a) Each Provider shall maintain and publish a publicly available list of panelists
and their qualifications.
(b) If neither the Complainant nor the Respondent has elected a three-member
Panel (Paragraphs 3(b)(iv) and 5(b)(iv)), the Provider shall appoint, within five
(5) calendar days following receipt of the response by the Provider, or the
lapse of the time period for the submission thereof, a single Panelist from its
list of panelists. The fees for a single-member Panel shall be paid entirely by
the Complainant.
(c) If either the Complainant or the Respondent elects to have the dispute decided
by a three-member Panel, the Provider shall appoint three Panelists in accor-
dance with the procedures identified in Paragraph 6(e). The fees for a three-
member Panel shall be paid in their entirety by the Complainant, except where
the election for a three-member Panel was made by the Respondent, in which
case the applicable fees shall be shared equally between the Parties.
(d) Unless it has already elected a three-member Panel, the Complainant shall
submit to the Provider, within five (5) calendar days of communication of a
response in which the Respondent elects a three-member Panel, the names and
contact details of three candidates to serve as one of the Panelists. These can-
didates may be drawn from any ICANN-approved Provider's list of panelists.
(e) In the event that either the Complainant or the Respondent elects a three-
member Panel, the Provider shall endeavor to appoint one Panelist from the
list of candidates provided by each of the Complainant and the Respondent. In
the event the Provider is unable within five (5) calendar days to secure the ap-
pointment of a Panelist on its customary terms from either Party's list of
candidates, the Provider shall make that appointment from its list of panelists.
The third Panelist shall be appointed by the Provider from a list of five candi-
dates submitted by the Provider to the Parties, the Provider's selection from
among the five being made in a manner that reasonably balances the
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to other alternative dispute resolution forums that operate in the privacy
rights area (ADRs), the panelists in Figure 1 are elected from a list speci-
fied by the provider and agreed to by the parties.65 As a result, even
though the complainant can elect the provider, the respondent has the
choice of determining the panel's composition. This makes the panel
more transparent than privacy rights forums, where the provider directly
appoints the panelists without intervention by the parties.'
Nonetheless, respondent participation takes place only in the case of
three-member panels. Otherwise, the provider is in charge of appointing
the panelists. This procedure has problems caused by the bias providers
have in favoring complainants.67
preferences of both Parties, as they may specify to the Provider within five (5)
calendar days of the Provider's submission of the five-candidate list to the Par-
ties.
(f) Once the entire Panel is appointed, the Provider shall notify the Parties of the
Panelists appointed and the date by which, absent exceptional circumstances,
the Panel shall forward its decision on the complaint to the Provider."
UDRP at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm
65. Agreement takes place in at least the three-member panel case.
66. See previous section.
67. "Given these inevitable biases, the ICANN Policy fails in another important way.
Each DRP lists a number of approved arbitrators, but there is no information about how par-
ticular individuals are assigned to particular cases, particularly those involving only one
arbitrator. In those cases, the parties have no input into the assignment of the arbitrator. Except
in cases of the most obvious and improper kind of bias, it is unlikely a party could success-
fully challenge a panelist. Each DRP has its own procedural rules regarding challenges. The
grounds upon which a challenge can be brought also vary. For example, NAF sets forth spe-
cific grounds for disqualification. None would preclude an arbitrator with known attitudes
about meaning of controversial UDRP provisions from deciding a case. Nor is there a system
for allowing parties, after a proceeding is over, to register complaints about a particular deci-
sion maker." Thomburg, supra note 31, at 222.
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FIGURE I: UDRP GENERAL PROCEDURE
Not within compliance of the
rules
Complaint is sent back
to Complainant, who
has 5 days to return it
with the necessary
corrections.
If one the parties
resort tou court, the
panel can decide to
continue or not
continue with the
Procedure
If the parties reach a
private agreement, the
procedure is
terminated.
Source: Own Elaboration based on ICANN UDRP, at www.icann.org
Once the panel forms, it has to decide the case. The panel also has
the power to ask for additional information from any of the parties. In
the event that the parties reach a private agreement, the panel terminates
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its process, without any further decision. Also, if any of the parties initi-
ate a court trial, the panel can continue with its deliberations or decide to
terminate the case.68 Even though the rules of the UDRP provide that
both parties have the same grace period to take a case to court, some
scholars have suggested that the short time available is detrimental for
respondents.69 One of the main limitations of these types of dispute reso-
lution regimes is that providers do not have jurisdiction in matters
initiated in court.70 That said, most UDRP cases do not reach the courts.7'
One of the problems of the UDRP procedure is the absence of a re-
view mechanism for complaints.72 This type of mechanism is in place in
other private ADRs and could provide for better review and control of
68. "K. AVAILABILITY OF COURT PROCEEDINGS. The mandatory administrative proceed-
ing requirements set forth in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent either you or the complainant from
submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before
such mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is con-
cluded. If an Administrative Panel decides that your domain name registration should be
canceled or transferred, we will wait ten (10) business days (as observed in the location of our
principal office) after we are informed by the applicable Provider of the Administrative
Panel's decision before implementing that decision. We will then implement the decision
unless we have received from you during that ten (10) business day period official documenta-
tion (such as a copy of a complaint, file-stamped by the clerk of the court) that you have
commenced a lawsuit against the complainant in a jurisdiction to which the complainant has
submitted under Paragraph 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure. (In general, that jurisdiction is
either the location of our principal office or of your address as shown in our Whois database.
See Paragraphs 1 and 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure for details.) If we receive such
documentation within the ten (10) business day period, we will not implement the Administra-
tive Panel's decision, and we will take no further action, until we receive (i) evidence
satisfactory to us of a resolution between the parties; (ii) evidence satisfactory to us that your
lawsuit has been dismissed or withdrawn; or (iii) a copy of an order from such court dismiss-
ing your lawsuit or ordering that you do not have the right to continue to use your domain
name." UDRP part 4.k, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.
69. See Froomkin, supra note 18 (analyzing the extent of the bias for respondents re-
sorting to court action).
70. "Although a UDRP decision is, in some respects, self-enforcing, it is not binding.
Either before or after a UDRP decision, either party can take the matter to court. Even after an
adverse decision under the UDRP, a respondent could pursue de novo litigation against a suc-
cessful claimant. This ability to "appeal" an unsuccessful UDRP case was recently affirmed by
the First Circuit Court of Appeals." Anderson and Cole, supra note 43, at 250.
71. According to UDRPLaw.net, until July 2002, just 65 UDRP cases were taken to
court. This is a small number as compared with the more than 6,000 cases UDRP providers
had considered since 1999. See, http://www.udrplaw.net/.
72. "UDRP arbitrators have rendered decisions that are inconsistent in their interpreta-
tion of the substantive requirements and in their implementation of the procedural rules.
Because the process contains no internal appeal process, there is no way to challenge any of
these decisions, either to correct the result in an individual case or to reconcile splits in what is
becoming the "law" of ICANN. There is no way to correct arbitrators who are creating bad
"law" or those who believe that trademark holders should have broader rights than those in-
cluded in the UDRP as written." Thomburg, supra note 31, at 224.
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the panelists' decisions." Conversely, one of the main advantages of the
UDRP regime in comparison to other private dispute resolution systems
for the Internet is that ICANN has the power to enforce the panel deci-
sions.74 In contrast, the only action that the panel can enforce is the
termination or transfer of the disputed domain name under ICANN's
management. 7' Enforcement in these situations is almost perfect when
compared to the lack of enforcement that privacy rights dispute resolu-
tion providers, dealing with different jurisdictions and the lack of
government support, have to contend with.76 The enforcement ability
arises from both ICANN's design and the design of the root system that
favors an uncompetitive market for root names.77 The legitimacy of
ICANN's functions, at least among the groups that have direct influence
on ICANN's Board of Directors, provides the basis for enforcing the
rules on domain name dispute resolution.78 These characteristics, based
on governmental delegation of powers to ICANN, make the UDRP one
of the most viable systems for dispute resolution on the Internet.
In order to maintain its legitimacy among countries and different
Internet users and beyond the groups that are currently part of the poli-
cymaking process, ICANN must develop new ways to incorporate the
79many constituencies of the Internet into its decision-making process.
Meanwhile, other groups, mainly users, but also the private sector, have
73. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 45 (describing the procedure of private ADRs).
74. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
75. Again, the characteristic of the Root system for the Internet, which is managed and
monopolized by ICANN generates a disincentive to other providers to offer other roots of
Domain Names. As a result, the actual design of the system provides ICANN with a well
defined power of enforcement of the UDRP. See Mueller, supra note 36 (describing the lack of
competition and monopoly of ICANN and the incentives the organization participants have to
maintain the system as it is).
76. One of the main weaknesses in enforcement is the existence of diverse roots in the
Internet. Nonetheless, because ICANN is the most important of these servers, there are just a
few domain names that cannot be reached by ICANN enforcement capabilities. The case of
ccTLDs are special since they are can be limited to the national jurisdictions of the participant
countries.
"An important aspect of the UDRP is the enforceability of the decisions. Although
trademark holders only have two remedies available to them under the UDRP, enforcement of
a successful result is automatic (absent court action by the respondent)." Anderson and Cole
supra note 43, at 250.
77. Id.
78. Legitimacy of ICANN actions have been under strong debate lately. See, Helfer and
Dinwoodie, supra note 36 (discussing how the problems of the UDRP undermine the legiti-
macy under which it is based).
79. See Froomkin, supra note 18 (questioning the legitimacy of ICANN to impose its
policies in the Internet.) Some constituencies on the Internet have a high degree of control
over ICANN's policymaking process
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a low level of participation.' The future success of the UDRP and
ICANN will depend upon the political pressure exerted on ICANN to
involve new participants and to develop new ways of allowing influence
to wide-ranging interest groups.8 ' In contrast to the privacy rights provid-
ers, the UDRP's particular structure makes it subject to both criticism
and change. At the same time, the UDRP's structure creates an opportu-
nity to maintain the consensus on common set of rules of the system.
B. Number of Participants
Under the UDRP system, most of the domain name owners are sub-
ject to the regulations of the UDRP."2 Consequently, every person or
entity that registers a new domain name is subject to ICANN's policies. 3
Thus, the UDRP system experiences wide coverage and uniform regula-
tion throughout most of the Internet. This feature is another important
distinction from other attempts to create private dispute resolution sys-
tems having voluntary regulatory regimes." As the only institution that
manages domain names and receives support from different govern-
ments, ICANN generates a quasi-automatic jurisdiction for those who
request a new domain name in any of the gTLDs.
C. International Cooperation
In the case of the UDRP, the nature of the issue regulated permits
better enforcement of the rules.85 However, international cooperation is
80. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 39 (discussing the political process inside
ICANN).
81. Id.
82. This characteristic depends on the concentrated structure of the root system and the
lack of competition. See MUELLER, supra note 17.
83. "1. PURPOSE. This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy")
has been adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"),
is incorporated by reference into your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the terms and
conditions in connection with a dispute between you and any party other than us (the registrar)
over the registration and use of an Internet domain name registered by you. Proceedings under
Paragraph '4 of this Policy will be conducted according to the Rules for Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules of Procedure"), which are available at
www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm, and the selected administrative-dispute-
resolution service provider's supplemental rules." UDRP part 1, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/
udrp/policy.htm.
84. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 45.
85. "ICANN has largely succeeded in solving the enforcement dilemma, although it is
not a solution that could easily be replicated in a different context. Because ICANN has a
contract with Network Solutions, Inc., which controls the computer that physically assigns
each domain name, it can not self enforce the UDRP decision. A winning complainant will
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needed to sustain the policy that is put in place throughout the Intemet.g6
Because the U.S. government supported ICANN, other developed coun-
tries now support ICANN's jurisdiction to resolve domain name
disputes. Nonetheless, most ccTLDs are still out of the reach of
ICANN's jurisdiction over UDRP policy."
The technical dependency of ccTLDs on ICANN, and on the United
States government, hinders the actual reach of the sovereignty of country
code managers. 9 The reforms of ICANN's political structure in 2002
provided for more participation to ccTLDs and facilitated a wider inter-
national consensus on ICANN policies.90 Some characteristics of the
ICANN structure help explain this success in reaching international con-
sensus. First, the management structure of ICANN has become more
open to participation and, after recent reforms, the international commu-
nity has more influence on ICANN policymaking.9' Different global
constituencies can participate in the decision-making and shaping of
ICANN policies.92 Major changes in the election of Board members and
in levels of participation of Country Code Registries (ccTLDs) have
either be awarded the domain name at issue or the name will be cancelled." Thornburg, supra
note 31, at 207.
86. The need for international cooperation is explained by the participation of ccTLDs
as one of the most active ICANN constituencies. Furthermore, it is through these international
actors that ICANN can cooperate in the developing of rules that apply throughout the Internet.
Recently, ccTLDs have upgraded their participation and voice in ICANN policymaking proc-
ess. See next section discussion.
87. See http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-whois.htm (listing all the countries that partici-
pate in ICANN).
88. Up to today, only a handful of ccTLDs have signed Sponsorship Agreements with
ICANN. See ICANN, Resources for Country Code Managers, at http://www.icann.org/cctlds/
(showing information about the ccTLDs managers that signed agreements with ICANN).
89. "Technically, the ccTLDs are subdomains of the "root domain" created by the U.S.
government and "contained" in the root zone file. Despite the U.S. reservation of technical
control over the A root, the U.S. government states that "[n]ational governments now have,
and will continue to have, authority to manage or establish policy for their own ccTLDs"
thereby attempting to downplay the influence that the U.S. may indirectly have over the poli-
cies of nations foreign to the U.S. At the same time, the U.S. maintained that national
governments and intergovernmental organizations should not directly manage the Internet
names and addresses. On this account, ICANN was intended to be a purely technical coordi-
nating body, whereas national governments would continue to control national politics." Kim
G. von Arx and Gregory R. Hagen, Sovereign Domains: A Declaration of Independence of
ccTLDsfrom Foreign Control, 9 RICH. J.L. & TtCH. 1, 20 (2002).
90. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 39. (describing the creation of a ccNSO constitu-
ency to participate directly in the management of ICANN).
91. Id. (analyzing how the pressure groups inside ICANN successfully resisted changes
to their political influence).
92. See ICANN, Bylaws, at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-
15dec02.htm (listing the new bylaws of ICANN with important changes in the influence of
different groups on the policy process).
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resulted from ICANN in becoming an international body with jurisdic-
tion over the Internet.93 These changes will permit more cooperation at
the international level, allowing for better enforcement of dispute resolu-
tion policies.94 Including international actors will also increase the need
for UDRP reform to accommodate different international perspectives.
For example, the growth of the Internet in Asia and the interest of
ICANN to continue being the main source of control and regulation over
domain names have prompted the creation of two new offices, one in
Hong Kong and the other in Beijing." These offices resolve disputes in
the Asian region.9 As a result, the UDRP could accommodate different
views and be open to changes, even though the groups with more power
inside ICANN will resist such reforms.97
93. Until December 15th 2002 the Board of Directors of the ICANN was composed of
nineteen members. Five of them came from the original Board of Directors established in
1998 and the other 14 came from the following organizations: 5 from the At Large Member-
ship. Each of these directors should represent a different geographic unit: Africa, Asia-
Australia-Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean and North America. 3 Board
Members came from the Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO). The DNSO was
composed of different constituency groups: Business, Non-Commercial, ccTLD Registries,
gTLD Registries, ISPs, Registrars and Intellectual Property Constituency. 3 Board Members
came from the Address Supporting Organization (ASO). This group was composed by the
Asian Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC), American Registry for Internet Numbers
(ARIN), Latin American and Caribbean Internet Address Registry (LACNIC) and Rdseaux IP
Europ6ens Network Coordination Centre (RIPENCC). Finally, 3 Board Members came from
the Protocol Supporting Organizations (PSO). The PSO was composed by the Internet Engi-
neering Task Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), International
Communication Union (ITU-T) and the European Telecommunications Standard Institute
(ETSI).
According to the new By-Laws of the ICANN, beginning in December 15, 2002, the
Board of Directors should be composed of 15 members elected as follows: 8 Directors from
the Nominating Committee, 2 from ASO, 2 from Country Code Name Supporting Organiza-
tion (ccNSO), 2 by Generic Name Supporting Organization (GNSO) and the President of
ICANN. The Nominating Committee is composed as follows: 5 from At Large Representa-
tion, 2 from Business Constituency of GNSO), I from gTLD Registry, 1 from gTLD
Registrars, I from Council Country Code NSO, I from ISP constituency GNSO, 1 from Intel-
lectual Property Constituency GNSO, I from ASO, 1 designated by ICANN Board to
represent Academy and other similar institutions, 1 from Consumer and Civil Society Groups
from the Non-commercial constituency of GNSO, I from IETF and I from ICANN Technical
Liaison Group. See ICANN, Bylaws, http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-
15dec02.htm for a complete version of the new By-Laws of ICANN.
94. See ICANN, Resources for Country Code Managers, at http://www.icann.org/
cctlds/ (describing the objectives and activities of ccTLDs in ICANN).
95. See Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre, Home page, at http://
www.adndrc.org/adndrc/index.html.
96. Id.
97. The analysis of the next section is a good example on how stakeholders of ICANN
could resist major reforms on the policymaking and retain power.
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Second, the constituencies that form the board of ICANN were cre-
ated to allow people from different countries to be part of ICANN and to
have a voice in the political process. 9 Nonetheless, groups and constitu-
encies that were introduced as initial parts of the organization have
controlled ICANN.99 As ICANN attempts to gain more international in-
fluence, these constituencies should accommodate the private sector,
internet users, and the government. ICANN is an institution in its forma-
tive stage, where different constituencies and groups are trying to
establish positions in the management of the institution, but without an
established procedure or representation. The forces that shape the po-
litical characteristics of ICANN will also shape the rules of its dispute
resolution policy. In the end, ICANN's success in promoting and enforc-
ing a set of dispute resolution rules for domain names on the Internet
will be due to both the capacity of ICANN's constituencies to accom-
modate different demands and the political process inside the
corporation that enables such a process to occur.
D. User Participation
User participation under the UDRP is much higher than the previous
study of privacy rights showed to be the case among third party institu-
tions (TPIs).'0° First, every user that registers a domain name on the
ICANN-managed root server falls automatically under the jurisdiction of
the provider and is subject to the rules of the UDRP.0 2 Second, ICANN
has provided, at least theoretically, numerous ways by which users can
contact the organization and propose reforms to the dispute resolution
98. "The ICANN Bylaws provide for three Supporting Organizations (SOs) to assist,
review and develop recommendations on Internet policy and structure within three specialized
areas. (See Bylaws, Article VI.) The SOs will help promote the development of Internet policy
and encourage international and diverse participation in the technical management of the
Internet. Each SO names three Directors to the ICANN Board" ICANN, Supporting Organi-
zations, at http://www.icann.org/dnso/sonew.htm (describing the different constituencies that
support ICANN).
99. See next section.
100. The reform process initiated in 2002 and the debate about the role of ICANN and
the division of power among different constituencies is a proof that ICANN is an organization
in a formation stage.
101. From the many critics mentioned in footnote 20, user participation in ICANN is far
from ideal. However, we found it more important than in the case of purely private regulation
systems.
102. "All registrars in the aero, .biz, .com, .coop, .info, museum, .name, .net, and .org
top-level domains follow the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (often re-
ferred to as the "UDRP")." Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://
www.icann.org/udrp/
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system.' °3 In ICANN, users have direct participation on the Board of Di-
rectors and elect representatives in the At Large Group and the Generic
Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) group.' 4 Despite this formal
structure, actual user participation in ICANN policymaking is scarce.
Instead, the commercial private sector is the main power that is in con-
trol of ICANN. Ultimately, although ICANN fares better than the
privacy rights TPIs, ICANN tends to prefer private firms' interests re-
garding domain name policies.
ICANN's critics point to the lack of democratic participation in its
decision-making.' 5 Because ICANN has strictly controlled the number
of top-level domain names, ICANN has created an artificial scarcity in
the market.'0 In response, specific private firms have developed an inter-
est in controlling this artificial scarcity. '°7 By allowing private firms to
compete with each other and provide options in the top-level domain
name arena, ICANN could improve users' welfare by providing more
alternatives than what currently exists."'8 Competition at this level, how-
ever, will decrease the value of the top domain names that already exist
today, thus hurting the profits of the firms that control them. As firms
develop significant influence over ICANN's decisions, the firms will
exert pressure to avoid competition. If, however, ICANN wants to pro-
mote cooperation and continue to advance in its governance of the
domain name system, it should accommodate users' demands.
One of the most common criticisms of the UDRP is that the domain
name rules enforced by providers unfairly protect trademark holders'
103. See ICANN, at http://www.icann.org/ (describing multiple instruments users have
to reach ICANN and participate).
104. See ICANN, At-Large Advisory Committee, at http://www.icann.org/committees/
alac/ (describing the tasks and composition of the At Large Group); ICANN, Generic Names
Support Organization, at http://gnso.icann.org/ (describing and informing about the different
constituencies that are part of the GNSO).
105. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
106. "ICANN's attempts to safeguard intellectual property interests in the domain name
space also shaped its policies toward the introduction of new top-level domains. New TLDs
were given a low priority relative to other objectives. Movement toward that goal was ex-
tremely slow. When new ones were introduced, the number was small and the approval
process encouraged registries to employ practices that would privilege trademark holders in
the initial assignment of names. So-called "sunrise" or "daybreak" procedures, for example,
allow all the world's trademark holders the privilege of preregistering their names in a new
top-level domain before the domain is opened up to anyone else. Both techniques offer pre-
emptive forms of protection that simply do not exist in traditional trademark law." MUELLER,
supra note 17, at 193.
107. Id.
108. See Milton Mueller, Success by Default: A New Profile of Domain Name Trade-
mark Disputes under ICANN's UDRP Convergence Center working Paper, June 2002
(describing the scarcity created by ICANN in the gTLDs registry).
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interests on the Internet, at the expense of free speech interests.' °9 For
example, if somebody registers a domain name called FIFAWorld-
Cup.com, devoted to criticizing the way the Fdration Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA) has designed the classification groups for
the 2006 World Cup in Germany, FIFA could claim that this domain
name infringes on its own trademark rights and seek to cancel this regis-
tration by initiating a complaint with a UDRP provider. These kinds of
problems have arisen because of the small number of top-level domain
names and the broad definitions applied for the type of content that is
admissible under each top-level domain name.
Another example arises if ICANN creates a new top-level domain
name for free speech, such as .fsp, in which all domain name registrants
have to be individuals or non-commercial entities. In such a situation, all
names, including trademarks, together with a prohibition against under-
taking commercial activities in this space, function to accommodate
many of the free speech concerns. ICANN may then have a commercial
set of top-level domain names requiring trademarks for name assignment
and also a free speech section where users can express themselves with-
out fear censorship. Nonetheless, under the current interests that
dominate ICANN, such a simple technical change is unexpected."
Internet users participate more in the UDRP than in any other pri-
vacy rights forums."' This is because parties have the opportunity to take
part in the formation of the arbitration panel and, consequently, they are
guaranteed a higher degree of impartiality and independence than when
they employ panels constituted directly by the private providers with
interests dominated by private businesses." 2 Although, it is clear that the
ICANN system is far from independent, given its bias towards private
firms, this bias is less than in the case of the completely private, privacy
rights forums.' 3
Given that the general governing rules employed by the UDRP pro-
viders are supplied by ICANN and users do have the opportunity,
although limited, to place representatives on ICANN's Board of Direc-
tors, these rules could be subject to review in order to ensure a more fair
109. See Blackman, supra note 22 (analyzing the issues of free speech in the Internet,
with particular reference to the Domain Name System).
110. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 39.
111. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 45.
112. See http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm.
113. See different points of view and critics detailed in footnote 35.
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treatment of non-commercial parties."4 International users participate
more in the rules and management of ICANN than privacy rights provid-115
ers. As a result, more international cooperation should occur, and the
UDRP may achieve a broader consensus." 6 As governments participate
in the process, it is more probable that consumers and other users can
exert greater influence over ICANN's decisions than the totally private
system that regulates privacy in e-commerce.,,
III. UDRP PROVIDERS
ICANN has authorized private providers to manage Internet users'
complaints."' These providers should follow ICANN's policy guidelines,
but may complement these rules with their own."l9 Initially, ICANN au-
thorized two providers, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) and the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), approved by
ICANN on December 1st and 23rd of 1999, respectively. In 2000,
ICANN added two providers, eResolution (eRes) in January and CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution (CPR) in May. eRes ceased to operate in
November 2001 and a new provider, Asian Domain Name Dispute Reso-
lution Centre (ADNDRC), with two offices in Beijing and Hong Kong,
was approved in February 2002."20 In this work, we will analyze the
cases decided by the four initial providers of UDRP services.
114. The recent reform of ICANN has drastically reduced the representation of at large
groups in the decision making process of ICANN, increasing the doubts about the legitimacy
of the Corporation. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 39.
115. "ICANN must be understood as a new international regime formed around a global
shared resource. Its purpose is to define property rights in Internet identifiers and to regulate
their consumption and supply.... The emerging Internet governance regime is the product of
an informal political agreement among national governments, and the agreement includes
much more extensive role for private sector actors. That fact does make ICANN different from
other international regimes, but it does not change its basic nature. It is much more accurate
and analytically fruitful to define ICANN as a variant of a standard international regime than
it is to think of it as something sui generis." MUELLER, supra note 17, at 217-218.
116. "ICANN's creation of its own international trademark law is inherently controver-
sial. What right does a California nonprofit corporation have to create and impose law that
differs from the law on nation-states?" Thornburg, supra note 31, at 208.
117. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 45.
118. See ICANN, at http://www.icann.org
119. See ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm
120. Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Center, at http://www.adndrc.org/
adndrc/index.htmj (The website of the Asian provider); ICANN, Announcement: ICANN An-
nounces New Dispute Resolution Provider in the Asia Pacific Region, at http://www.icann.org/
announcements/announcement-03dec01.htm (The announcement of ICANN creating the new
Asian provider for the UDRP regime).
The Market for Private Dispute Resolution Services
The United Nations created the first of the UDRP providers, the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),' 2' in 1994 with the
intention of providing mediation services for private parties in specific
areas.12 WIPO, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, was primarily
responsible for creating the UDRP regime. In fact, in April 1999, WIPO
produced a final report on the creation of a domain name resolution sys-
tem that became the blueprint for ICANN's own UDRP.
123
Other dispute resolution services such as the NAF, eRes CPR, and
ADNRC emerged after ICANN's inception. The National Arbitration
Forum (NAF), composed of judges and lawyers from around the world,
was created in 1986 to provide alternative dispute resolution services to
different parties. '2 The Center for Public Resources (CPR), a nonprofit
organization consisting of more than 500 private corporations, was
formed in 1979 by major corporations in order to provide alternative
dispute resolution forums for private businesses.2 2 Finally, eResolution
(eRes), located in Quebec, Canada, was formed in 2000. However, eRes
suspended its activities in 2001.
In 2002, ICANN approved the addition of an Asian dispute resolu-
tion provider, ADNDRC, with offices in Hong Kong and Beijing.1
26
121. "WIPO is one of the 16 specialized agencies of the United Nations system of or-
ganizations. It administers 23 international treaties dealing with different aspects of
intellectual property protection." WIPO, About WIPO, at http://www.wipo.int/about-
wipo/en/overview.html
"WIPO is an organ of the United Nations with specific duties defined by a series of trea-
ties. Signatory nations send delegates to WIPO, and meet occasionally in plenary to make
decisions. Being responsible to all its members states rather than just the United States, the
WIPO staff felt empowered to define its own terms of reference and proposed to make rec-
ommendations concerning: 1) dispute prevention; 2) dispute resolution; 3) a process to protect
famous and well-known marks in the gTLDs; and 4) the effects on intellectual property rights
of the new gTLDs." Froomkin, supra note 18, at 624.
122. "Developed by leading experts in cross-border dispute settlement, the procedures
offered by the Center are widely recognized as particularly appropriate for technology, enter-
tainment and other disputes involving intellectual property."
123. See WIPO, Final Report of the First WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, at
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process l/report/index.html; see also Froomkin, supra note 18 (analyzing
the characteristics of the WIPO proposal and the final outcome from ICANN policy).
124. "[T]he Forum's only mission is to provide superior dispute resolution services to
parties seeking an alternative to litigation." National Arbitration Forum, at
http://www.arbforum.coml. The NAF is located in the United States. Most of the UDRP cases
evaluated by the NAF are from the North American region.
125. "Founded in 1979 as the Center for Public Resources, CPR's mission is to spear-
head innovation and promote excellence in public and private dispute resolution, and to serve
as a primary multinational resource for avoidance, management and resolution of business-
related and other disputes." CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, About Us, at
http://www.cpradr.org/CPR AboutUs.asp?M= 1.1
126. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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ADNDRC is a combination of the China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and the Hong Kong Interna-
tional Arbitration Centre (HKIAC).127 The CIETAC is the only dispute
resolution provider for the top domain name .cn. Meanwhile, HKIAC,
created in 1985, is an alternative dispute resolution system. In 200,
HKIAC became the sole dispute resolution provider for the top domain
name .hk.
28
A. Characteristics of the Providers
As previously explained, ICANN provides the rules for the admini-
stration of the UDRP. Accordingly, the authorized providers must follow
these rules. There are, however, some differences between the providers.
In this section we analyze the differences between these providers, fo-
cusing on the supplemental rules, fees, and relative representation
afforded by the arbitration panel.
1. Supplemental Rules
Besides the UDRP rules provided by ICANN, private providers can
add rules that do not contradict ICANN policy. 29 Most of these addi-
tional rules concern general procedures for the cases evaluated by the
provider. Table 1 presents the main characteristics of the supplemental
rules for each provider.
127. See Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre, at http://www.adndrc.org/
adndrc/index.html.
128. Id.
129. See ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm
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TABLE I: SUPPLEMENTAL RULES OF
AUTHORIZED UDRP PROVIDERS
WIPO NAF CPR eRes ADNDRC
Submission Cover sheet and Coversheet plus 3 5 Copies Three parts: Cover Sheet, hard
Requirements copies to Registrar(s) copies (single panel) or Complaint proper, and electronic
and Respondent 5 copies (Three Annexes and copy. Detailed
Member Panel) Cover Sheet format of
Complaint
Compliance Center has 5 days to Left to the Panel Clerk has 10 days Three days from
Review review without a specific to review and fee payment
requirement Complainant has
5 days to correct
any deficiency.
Official Center appoints Case Clerk's Office Relevant office at
Administering the Administrator the Centre
Case
Panel Three Member Panel: Single Member Panel: Not mentioned Single Member Single Member
Appointment Parties should provide Appointed by the Panel: Appointed Panel: appointed
list of 3 candidates, Forum by the Clerkes by Centre
ordered by preference. Office
The third panelist Three Member Panel: Three Member
appointed is the Chair elected by the Three Member Panel: Both
president. Parties can Provider and not part of Panel: Appointed parties propose
agree on naming the the Parties' list of by Provider. One three candidates.
president, candidates panelist from the Centre selects
lists of each party one from each of
and the third these lists, and
appointed by the the third one from
Provider the list at the
(President). Centre.
Recusation of Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Decided by the Not Mentioned
Panelists Clerk's Office
Respondent Panel should be Panel appointed by the Not Mentioned Panel Appointed Decided by
Default appointed by the Center. Option to by Provider Centre
Center. change to a one
member panel should
be provided.
Limits to Word limit: Paragraph Complaint and Complaint and Not mentioned Not Mentioned
Submission 3(b)(ix) 5000 words Response no longer Response not to
than 10 pages total exceed 10 pages
5(b)(i) 5000 words plus annexes and
exhibits.
15(e) no word limit
Extension for Not mentioned Extension can be given Not Mentioned Could be Could be
Response subject to: Parties extended by the extended by the
agreement, notice to Panel Panel
the Forum, state
exceptional
circumstances, state
extension (no more
than 20 days) and pay
extension fee of $100.
Forum will decide on
the xtension.
Additional Not Mentioned Within 5 days of Not Mentiored Not Mentioned Not Mentioned
Submissions submission of the
Response and it
should be
accompanied by a fee
of $250.
Source: Own Elaboration based in: http://www.udrpinfo.com/eres/supprules.htm,
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/background/index.html,
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/UDRP/rules.asp,
http://www.cpradr.org/ICANN_RulesAndFees.htm.
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Even though the differences in the supplementary rules are minimal,
and most of them are related to the format and timing of the submissions
of information and evidence to the panel, the effects of such differences
in procedure could have important consequences on the efficiency and
results of the procedure.' Some of the providers, such as WIPO' and
eRes, '3 have a more complex system of procedure than others such as
NAF 33 and CPR. For example, CPR's rules are minimal and most of the
decisions are left to the panel to decide what is best. In fact, because it is
the only provider that charges for extra submissions and time extensions,
NAF is the only provider that offers incentives to minimize information
submissions and time. These fees could, however, be a problem for par-
ties attempting to submit new evidence or information regarding a
case. 34 Nonetheless, the general fee for NAF is lower than the other pro-
viders, and the extra fees are much smaller. Beyond these small
differences, most of the rules are similar for all of the providers (Table
1).
2. Fees
Fees are another way of distinguishing providers. Given that the
rules are applied uniformly across providers, differences among the fees
that providers charge can induce complainants to switch from one pro-
vider to another. Table 2 shows the schedule of fees charged by each
provider.
130. See Section IV.1 (analyzing the results of cases handled by the same panelists in
different providers).
131. "The WIPO/AMC Supplemental Rules include very few changes to ICANN's
Rules. The Supplemental Rules do, however, provide for cases to be filed through the Center's
"Internet based case filing and administration system"." Stacey King, supra note 36, at 476-
477.
132. "eResolution's Supplemental Rules include twenty-one definitions. These include
the definitions set out in the Rules, as well as adding a number of additional definitions. None
of the definitions however, significantly changes the process or procedures. They simply act to
clarify certain terms." Id. at 47 8-479.
133. "Like the WIPO/AMC, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) has adopted the
definitions set forth in the Rules without supplementing them." Id. at 481.
134. "The NAF "sandbag" rule is one of the most pernicious examples of a provider's
attempt to distinguish itself as plaintiff-friendly. A rule that allows a party to pay to put in a
surprise pleading, perhaps with new factual allegations or even a new case in chief, is not a
rule calculated to achieve justice." Froomkin, supra note 18, at 703.
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TABLE 2: FEES CHARGED BY PROVIDERS
NAF
No. Domain Names Single Panel Three Member Panel
1 $1,150 $2,500
2 $1,300 $2,600
3-5 $1,400 $2,800
6-10 1 $1,750 $3,500
11-15 $2,000 $4,000
16 or more To be Determined To be Determined
WIPO
No. Domain Names Single Panel Three Member Panel
1-5 $1,500 $4,000
6-10 $2,000 $5,000
More than 10 To be Determined To be Determined
CPR
No. Domain Names Single Panel Three Member Panel
1-2 $2,000 $4,500
3-5 $2,500 $6,000
More than 6 To be Determined To be Determined
ADNDRC
No. Domain Names Single Panel Three Member Panel
1-2 $1,000 $2,000
3-5 $1,200 $2,400
6-9 $1,600 $2,900
More than 10 $3,000 1 $5,500
Source: http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/, http://www.arbforum.com/domains/,
http://www.cpradr.org/ICANNMenu.htm,
http://www.adndrc.org/adndrc/bj-supplementalrules.html
There are two main characteristics of Table 2. First, the cost of the
procedure across providers is not prohibitive. In fact, the cost is much
lower than the expected costs of resorting to court action to resolve the
conflict.' Second, the differences in prices among providers are not big
enough to promote a high substitution effect among providers. For ex-
ample, the most popular provider is WIPO, which charges a higher fee
than NAF, the second most popular provider. WIPO's fees average 16%
135. "[E]ven though the DRP's fees have already increased by at least 50% in the short
time the policy has been in operation, it is still regarded as a bargain by trademark holders."
Thornburg, supra note 31, at 204.
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more than NAF's for those cases where the number of domain names is
between one and five. For the cases between six and ten domain names,
the difference is just 14% among these two providers. CPR has a 24%
higher cost that NAF for cases involving one to five domain names. Ac-
cordingly, these figures suggest that the system is providing affordable
dispute resolution services without producing a high level of competition
among providers.
3. Geographical Representation of Arbitrators
The type of panelists offered to complainants and respondents is the
third main variable the providers must manage. In most instances, panel-
ists are usually former judges or lawyers from different countries. 1 6
Consequently, the panelists' different backgrounds could have an influ-
ence over the final results of their verdicts. This is a very important issue
on the Internet, where people from different parts of the world do busi-
ness. As a result, a common set of rules for every user of the Internet
should take into account the diversity of the panelists offered by each
provider. Of equal importance is that those countries with higher levels
of connectivity to the Internet should receive a greater share of the panel-
ists. Table 3 shows the distributions of panelists for each provider across
countries.
TABLE 3: PANELISTS
% World Panelists % of Total)
Internet WIPO NAF CPR ADNDRC
WIPO NAF CPR ADNDRC Users
Argentina 4 2 0.66% 1.20% 1.40%
Australia 19 1 1 1 1.44% 5.80% 0.70% 2.70% 2.22%
Austria 2 1 0.52% 0.60% 0.70%
Belgium 5 1 0.64% 1.50% 0.70%
Brazil 8 3 1.60% 2.40% 2.20%
Canada 21 7 1 2 2.69% 6.40% 5.00% 2.70% 4.44%
Chile 5 0.62% 1.50%
China 2 2 1 22 6.72% 0.60% 1.40% 2.70% 48.89%
Colombia 2 3 0.23% 0.60% 2.20%
Croatia 1 0.05% 0.30%
Cyprus 1 0.03% 0.30%
Czech 3 0.28% 0.90%
Republic
Denmark 2 1 0.58% 0.60% 0.70%
136. See UDRP Panelists, at http://www.udrpinfo.com/panl.php (providing information
and profiles of the panelists of the UDRP system).
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% World Panelists (% of Total)
Internet WIPO NAF CPR ADNDRC
WIPO NAF CPR ADNDRC Users
Ecuador 1 1 0.07% 0.30% 0.70%
Egypt 3 0.12% 0.90%
Finland 1 0.45% 0.30%
France 17 2 1 3.12% 5.20% 1.40% 2.22%
Germany 9 6.14% 2.80%
Ghana 1 0.01% 0.30%
Greece 2 0.28% 0.60%
Hungary 2 1 0.30% 0.60% 0.70%
India 6 2 2 1.40% 1.80% 1.40% 4.44%
Ireland 2 2 0.18% 0.60% 1.40%
Israel 5 2 0.36% 1.50% 1.40%
Italy 10 2 1 3.27% 3.10% 1.40% 2.70% 1
Jamaica 2 0.02% 0.60%
Japan 8 1 11.15% 2.40% 0.70%
Liechtenstein 1 0.00% 0.70%
Malaysia 2 1 1.30% 0.60% 0.70%
Mexico 6 2 1 0.72% 1.80% 1.40% 2.22%
Netherlands 6 1.58% 1.80% 1
New Zealand 6 1 2 0.22% 1.80% 0.70% 4.44%
Nigeria 1 0.02% 0.30%
Norway 4 0.54% 1.20%
Pakistan 1 0.10% 0.30%
Paraguay 1 0.01% 0.70%
Puerto Rico 1 0.12% 0.70%
Portugal 3 0.50% 0.90%
Republic of 9 5 3 4.86% 2.80% 3.60% 6.67%
Korea
Romania 1 0.20% 0.30%
Singapore 6 1 0.30% 1.80% 2.22%
South Africa 2 1 0.61% 0.60% 0.70%
Spain 10 3 3 3 1.47% 3.10% 2.20% 8.10% 6.67%
Sweden 6 2 0.92% 1.80% 1.40%
Switzerland 14 2 0.44% 4.30% 1.40%
Uganda 1 1 0.01% 0.30% 0.70% 1
UK 28 2 1 4.79% 8.60% 1.40% 2.22%
US 93 85 30 3 28.48% 28.40% 61.20% 81.10% 6.67%
Vietnam 1 0.20% 0.70%
Zimbabwe 1 0.02% 0.30%
Other 3 6.67%
Total 327 139 37 45
Source: http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/, http://www.arbforum.comldomains/,
http://www.cpradr.org/ICANNMenu.htm, World Bank Country Indicators, at
http://www.worldbank.org/
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Although there are important differences between providers, WIPO
has a more diverse group of panelists from both developed and less-
developed countries.13'7 The most favored countries in WIPO are Austra-
lia, Canada, France, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These
countries account for 33.4% of the panelists and only 13.95% of Internet
users. The least represented (Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development) OECD member countries are Japan, Germany, and
Korea. These countries account for 8% of the panelists and 22.5% of
Internet users. The United States' representation in the group of panelists
is almost equal to the share of U.S. Internet users. WIPO's relative diver-
sity may be due to the relationship WIPO has with the United Nations
and WIPO's need for worldwide representation.'38 Nevertheless, Asia,
especially East Asia, receives unfavorable treatment with respect to the
choice of panelists.'39 This region accounts for 26% of total Internet us-
ers, but their representation is just 10% (WIPO), 8% (NAF), and 2.4%
(CPR). This bias may explain the creation of new UDRP providers for
the East Asian region in 2002.' 4 In the next section we explore the ef-
fects panelists and specific country cases have on the providers'
performance.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The development of the UDRP system has drawn the attention of
many researchers since the regime's inception in 1999."4' The creation of
a global dispute resolution system that covered all gTLDs domain names
was an ambitious task undertaken in a basically unregulated environ-
ment.'42 Up until now, however, most of the studies about ICANN UDRP
137. Even though countries from the OECD represent 87% of the total panelists and
account for 75% of Internet users in the World.
138. On the other hand, in both CPR and NAF, the United States is heavily represented,
having most of the panelists in the list of both providers.
139. This region includes the following countries: India, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan,
China (including Hong Kong), and Republic of Korea.
140. See supra note 117.
141. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
142. "All in all, about 70% of the world's domain name registrations now fall under the
jurisdiction of the UDRP. The percentage will probably increase in the future as new top-level
domains are introduced by ICANN." Milton Mueller, Rough Justice; An Analysis of ICANN's
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy. Convergence Center, Syracuse University School of In-
formation Studies.
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are devoted to the theoretical debate of the virtues and failures of the
system in providing effective regulation of Domain Names complaints. 3
Professor Milton Mueller at Syracuse University undertook one of
the first empirical attempts to understand and evaluate the performance
of the UDRP.'44 Professor Mueller constructed a database with most of
the data concerning the cases evaluated through the ICANN UDRP re-
gime.' His first empirical work was an attempt to describe the
performance of the system and explain the differences in providers' mar-
ket shares. '46 The work provided useful empirical information on the
characteristics of the providers and the performance of both the system
as a whole and individual private providers.
Professor Mueller determined that a bias existed in the system be-
cause the providers that favored complainants were also the ones that
received the higher market share.147 WIPO and NAF received 61% and
3 1% of the cases respectively, having a winning rate for complainants of
67.5% and 7 1.5% respectively. 4 1 On the other hand, eRes, which was
seen as being more lenient with respondents, had a market share of just
7% with a winning rate percentage for complainants of just 44.2%.'49
The winning rate for complainants was very high in those cases where
the respondent defaulted, thus providing an explanation for the differ-
ences in complainant winning rates among providers.5
Professor Mueller's work also presents an econometric analysis of
the cases. The conclusions of the analysis are that the market shares that
the NAF and WIPO receive depend on their influence over the U.S. and
143. See supra note 36.
144. See supra note 137, and Milton Mueller, Success by Default, A New Profile of Do-
main Name Trademark Disputes under ICANN's UDRP Convergence Center, Syracuse
University, June 2002.
145. To access the database see, http://dcc.syr.edu/markle/mhome.htm
146. See Mueller, supra note 142.
147. "There is statistical evidence that selection of dispute resolution service providers
by challengers leads to forum shopping that biases the results." Id. at 2.
148. Id. at 1 1-14.
149. Id.
150. "The high default rate can be interpreted in two opposing ways. Either the UDRP
procedure moves too fast for ordinary domain name registrants to receive notice or to defend
themselves adequately, or many of the challenged names were abandoned by registrants, who
saw little point in defending them. We tend toward the latter interpretation, without ruling out
the possibility that a significant minority of cases fall into the former category. We found a
small number of cases with late responses, but many panelists accepted the late submissions or
delayed the proceedings to obtain a response." Id. at 12. When the respondent contested the
complaint, the winning percentage for the complainant was 43% eRes, 50% NAF, and 54%
WIPO. Id. at 12.
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rest of the world.'5 ' Furthermore, the system is biased towards the com-
plainants and eRes's low market share is due to the fact that its
resolutions favor respondents."' The author also proposed some changes
in the system in order to avoid forum shopping.1 3 Nonetheless, an Inter-
national Trademark Association (INTA) report criticized the results of
this research effort.5 4 This report notes flaws in Professor Mueller's
analysis including: (1) misunderstandings in the functioning of UDRP;
(2) inappropriate statistical evidence to support the claims of bias; (3)
inadequate review of UDRP cases; (4) lack of analysis and data showing
the rate of challenges to UDRP decisions; (5) the fact that disputed do-
main names are a small percentage of total domain names; and (6) the
UDRP effect of discouraging registrations that infringe domain names."'
Professor Michael Geist provides another major piece of empirical
evidence on the ICANN UDRP system. 6 He based his work on the
analysis of the general data from UDRP cases. Professor Geist's conclu-
sions are similar to Professor Mueller's, finding evidence of bias and
forum shopping among providers. Furthermore, Geist suggests that panel
performance is quite different when separated into one member and
three-member panels.5 7 Geist's work suggests that three-member panels
151. For eRes, the market share was determined by the high complainant loss rate. Id. at
18.
152. Id.
153. "To remedy the bias inherent in complainant forum shopping, ICANN should mod-
ify the UDRP to allow domain name registrars to select the dispute resolution provider(s) who
will handle disputes over names they register. The incentives of registrars are more balanced
because end users have a choice of which registrar to use. Registrar selection compares fa-
vorably to other possible remedies, such as random assignment of cases to dispute resolution
service providers, an appeal process, or modification of the language of the policy." Id. at 2.
154. Ned Branthover, UDRP-A Success Story: A Rebuttal to the Analysis and Conclu-
sions of Professor Milton Mueller in "Rough Justice," International Trademark Association
(INTA) Internet Committee, May, 2002.
155. Id. at 1-2.
156. Michael Geist, supra note 36 and Michael Geist, Fundamentally Faircom? An
Update on Bias Allegations and the ICANN UDRP, University of Ottawa, at
http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:IcTBTMqnAJUJ:aixl .uottawa.ca/-geist/fairupdate.pdf
+fundamentally+fair.com&hl=en&start= 1 &client=safari
157. "At least three factors contribute to the greater confidence in the three-person panel.
First, this panel configuration eliminates the possibility that a single panelist may simply mis-
interpret the UDRP and render the wrong decision. Second, the three-person panel forces
panelists to more carefully consider their decision by justifying it before their counterparts on
the panel.... Third, and most importantly, the three-member panel completely alters the pan-
elist selection process. In a single panel case, the arbitration provider is exclusively
responsible for allocating the case to a panelist. Conversely, in a three member panel, the arbi-
tration provider wields comparatively little influence over the selection process. Both the
complainant and respondent are typically allowed to select one of the three panel members by
submitting a list of three or five acceptable candidates of which the provider will select one.
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offer a lower winning rate for complainants: 62% (WIPO), 49%(NAF),
and 50% (eRes) for three-member panels versus 83% (WIPO),
86%(NAF), and 64%(eRes) for single member panels.'58 Accordingly,
Geist suggests that straightforward changes to a mandatory three-
member panel regime will reduce system bias.'59
The INTA has also criticized Geist's work.'60 The INTA's critical re-
view suggests that Professor Geist's work: (1) was nothing more than a
simple statistical analysis of the cases without adequately measuring for
fairness; (2) did not consider the default cases in the calculation of the
winning percentage for complainants; (3) did not analyze other causes
that could justify high winning percentage ratio; and (4) did not consider
that forum selection can be the result of other factors such as quality and
reputation, costs, etc, rather than bias.' 6' Although, both Geist and Muller
asserted that the UDRP was created to solve the problem of abusive reg-
istration and that a higher winning rate for complainants than for
respondents should be the expected norm, both INTA reports criticized
Geist and Muller's assumption that a 50% winning rate for complainants
and respondents is normal.
62
Dr. Annette Kur of the Max-Plank-Institute completed the last major
piece of empirical work on ICANN. 63 Kur presented an excellent em-
pirical description of the performance of the UDRP system that
considered the most disparate variables and characteristics of the panels'
The provider selects the third member of the panel, but only after it has provided both the
complainant and respondent with the opportunity to indicate which panelist they prefer."
Geist, supra note 36, at 22.
158. Id. at 19. Note that CPR and ADNDRC are not included as they have too few cases
for statistical analysis.
159. "Rather than focusing on provider selection as a means of solving the forum shop-
ping issue, ICANN must turn its attention to panelist selection. If providers continue to
maintain exclusive and unchecked authority over the selection of panelists in 90% of all the
cases, no reform of the rules nor to (of?) how a provider is selected will remove the potential
for bias in panelist allocation." Id., at 28.
160. INTA, The UDRP by AU Accounts Works Effectively. Rebuttal to Analysis and Con-
clusions of Professor Michael Geist in "Fair.com?" and "Fundamentally Fair.com?"
International Trademark Association, INTA Internet Committee, May 2002.
161. Id. at 2.
162. "At one point in Faircom, Professor Geist asserts that "only one panelist had a
respondent winning percentage under 50%". The use of the word "only" and the use of 50%
as a point of reference suggest that Professor Geist is treating 50% as "the norm". However,
50% is not a norm for litigation; 50% is a norm for probability." Id. at 3.
163. Annette Kur, UDRP, A Study by the Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and Interna-
tional Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Munich and Institute for Intellectual Property
Law and Market Law, University of Stockholm, Institute for Information Law, Technical Uni-
versity of Karlsruhe, at http://www.intellecprop.mpg.de/Online-Publikationen/2002UDRP-
study-final-02.pdf.
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decisions. The main conclusion of Kur's work is: "[g]enerally speaking,
the survey shows that fears concerning the risk that the policy might be
misused by large companies in order to freeze competition and free
speech are largely unfounded. [A]lthough UDRP is functioning well as a
matter of principle, there are certain points where the picture becomes
somewhat unclear." 6'
Most of the current debate centers on the assumption that providers'
bias towards complainants is the main variable that matters in explaining
user and provider behavior.'65 Although bias is important, provider per-
formance can be more important in determining the users' choice of
provider. In this respect, our work offers a richer empirical analysis,
looking at the different factors that explain the performance of the
UDRP. Furthermore, there are other variables, such as providers' effi-
ciency, that help to explain the selection process better than the argued
bias toward complainants. The aim of this work is to re-evaluate the
claims of the main empirical work in this area and to provide a more ac-
curate explanation of UDRP performance.
V. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
ICANN strictly controls the UDRP with guidelines and rules. As a
result, the system has a common policy that should normalize the deci-
sions and performance of private courts. Given that ICANN fixes the
general rules, the other two main variables that can affect the perform-
ance of the system are the price charged in each case and the speed of
the procedure.' 66 We found that the duration of each case is the only vari-
able each provider can use to differentiate from the other providers. In
fact, the duration of the trial is one of the main factors for the UDRP's
existence. 1
67
The creation of a cheap and fast procedure for conflict resolution
was one of ICANN's main objectives. The duration of the trial will de-
164. Id. at 57-58.
165. See supra note 36.
166. Prices charged by each provider are not different enough to generate a bias favoring
any of the providers. Also, there is no evidence of systemic price competition.
167. "The UDRP also succeeds in being a process that resolves disputes quickly. Most of
the cases are disposed of within the allotted times, which are themselves very short. The abil-
ity to transmit information electronically undoubtedly adds to the speed of the process. While
the process achieves speed by allowing very little input and by limiting the issues involved, it
must be said that speed was the drafters' primary goal and it was successfully accomplished.
Note, however, that this speed is far more likely to benefit the complainant than the respon-
dent." Thornburg, supra note 31, at 20 4-205.
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pend on the specific technology each provider uses to decide cases. In
general, both complainants and defendants prefer a faster system be-
cause both providers have a uniform and independent review system.1
68
The duration of the trial will depend on the general characteristics of
each provider, as well as the characteristics of the case presented. In this
section we explore some regression models to determine the characteris-
tics of the UDRP system as a whole, and of each provider.
A. Are Complainants Selecting Providers by Bias or Efficiency?
Most empirical analyses of the UDRP have focused on analyzing the
cases for each provider and the differences among them. Some of the
most complete empirical works are by Geist (2001), Mueller (2001), and
Kur (2002). '69 Mueller (2001) contends that the UDRP is biased in favor
of the private firms most of the time. The fact that the only provider that
had favored consumers and individuals lost market share and went bank-
rupt is strong evidence in support of the bias claims. 70 Kur's study also
described the performance of the UDRP in terms of the results from the
cases presented. These studies do, however, show only part of the em-
pirical evidence, and their analysis is mostly based on descriptive
statistics. The INTA criticized Geist and Muller's works for the use of
simple statistics and the lack of a qualitative analysis.' 7' In short, the
main critiques of these studies are their reliance on ex-post analysis,
looking at the results of the UDRP and analyzing the presence of bias
favoring complainants.
Geist and Muller's analyses are based on simple statistics that de-
scribe the results of the model. The analyses lack a clear model testing
168. See, Froomkin, supra note 18, at 675 (discussing the problem of allowing short
time for the case of small firms and consumer responses).
169. They present evidence on the differences in treatment of private firms and individu-
als in the UDRP regime. See Mueller, supra note 142; Geist, supra note 36; Kur, UDRP, supra
note 163.
170. See Section III.
"The Fair.com study concluded by arguing that there was compelling evidence that fo-
rum shopping has become an integral part of the UDRP and that the system may indeed be
biased in favor of trademark holders[ ]. In the seven months since the release of that study,
evidence to that effect has continued to mount, while the explanations of UDRP supporters
have been proven incorrect. With eResolution now in bankruptcy court, NAF granting an ever-
larger share of its caseload to a small group of panelists, and the red herring of defaults vs.
non-defaults conclusively disproved, the need for ICANN UDRP reform has become increas-
ingly urgent." Geist, supra note 36, at 8-9.
"Moreover, the fact that eResolutions is now in bankruptcy may have been due to a num-
ber of factors wholly unrelated to alleged forum shopping." International Trademark
Association, supra note 160 at 7.
171. INTA Internet Committee, supra notes 154 and 160.
326 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 11:285
the authors' thesis. In this paper, we will look at an important measure
of efficiency, as we will try to understand the technology behind each
of these providers. This analysis, based on econometric techniques,
will provide better tools for determining the actual functioning of the
UDRP system. Although we will examine some of the questions posed
by these empirical studies, we will also examine the productivity con-
ditions of each provider. The providers' performance is an overlooked
part of most of the UDRP studies that are based on an ex-post analysis
of the results.
Most studies point to the high ratio of cases in which complainants
win as an indicator of the bias of the system. Furthermore, the studies
predict that the higher ratio of complainants winning cases will induce
future complainants to forum shop and select those providers with a
higher winning percentage. Nonetheless, these studies do not assert what
should be a fair ratio of complainants winning cases. More importantly,
there was no testing of the choices complainants faced at the moment of
selecting the provider. In this section, we intend to develop an ex-ante
model, explaining complainants' behavior at the moment of selecting the
provider. We assume that the price variable is not significant in selecting
the provider.
Complainants have two main motivations for choosing a provider.
First, complainants can choose a provider based on the bias favoring the
complainants. This has been the main argument for those analyzing the
UDRP system. Second, complainants are also willing to choose the pro-
vider that is most efficient at handling the case and generating a shorter
172waiting time. We assume that each complainant (or consumer) who has
a complaint will pick a provider j from a set of J providers at time i and
the utility derived from this choice is given by a random utility model,
Uij = i "1  (1)
Where Uij is the utility of complainant i for choosing provider j, and
i=l, .. . n and j=l,. .. m;
0' is a vector of the coefficient for the vector of explanatory vari-
ables z.j for each consumer; and Fii is an error term.
According to equation 1, if the complainant makes the choice j, we
assume that U.. is the maximum among the possible utilities derived from
the rest of the providers in the set J. As a result, the statistical model is
driven by the probability that choice j is made, which is,
172. This is an efficiency motive for choosing providers, which has been neglected in the
literature about the UDRP.
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Pr ob(Uii > Uik ) for all other k # j (2)
Accordingly, given a random variable that represents the choice
made by complainants, Yi, then the probability can be expressed as,
Prob(Yi = j) = e (3)
1--e fi'Zij
j='
This model is the conditional logit model. In our case, the dependent
variable Yij is given by the selection of each complainant in the UDRP
system. The providers are NAF, WIPO, and eRes, i.e. J=3. The explana-
tory variables that determine the probability that a given utility under a
given provider is bigger than the utility of any of the others are: (1) the
two main characteristics of each providers; (2) the bias favoring com-
plainants; (3) represented by the ratio of cases that have been decided in
the favor of complainants by each provider; and (4) the efficiency of
each provider, measured by the average duration of the cases managed
by each provider. In accordance with this model, we are evaluating the
probability of each complainant choosing a provider based on these
measures of the performance of the providers. This model is more suit-
able for analyzing the causes of the preference for some providers with
respect to others instead of simply looking at the ex-post results of the
system and elaborating a suitable explanation for those results.
We have calculated a complete series of different indicators for the
bias and the efficiency measures. First, for measuring bias we have the
following variables. Complaint is the ratio of cases won by the com-
plainants to cases brought by complainants since the beginning of the
provider's operations and up to the day the complainant presents the case
to a provider. 73 Monthly Complaint is the measure of cases won by the
complainants in the current month the complaint is being presented.
Monthly Complaint Lagged is the same measure as Monthly Complaint,
but lagged one month. Duration is the natural logarithm of the average
duration of the cases for each provider since the beginning of the opera-
tions of the provider.174 Monthly Duration is the natural logarithm of the
average duration of the cases for each provider in the current month the
case is being presented to a provider. Monthly Duration Lagged is the
same measure as Monthly Duration, but lagged one month.
173. Complaint is calculated in a daily basis from January 2000 to November 2002.
174. Duration is calculated daily from January 2000 to November 2003.
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Our analysis focuses on testing whether the probability of selecting
one of the providers depends on the complainant bias or on the
provider's efficiency in handling the cases. In order to be sure of the
relationship between the election of provider and these variables, we
tested a series of similar models using the variables mentioned previ-
ously. "'75 The dependent variable, Provider, represents the selection of
the provider made by each claimant. Table 4 lists the results of our re-
gression models. According to this model, the explanatory variables we
considered for the provider selection are: (1) the ratio of complainants
winning the cases for each provider during the current month in which
the complainant was presented (Cmnaf, Cmwipo and Cmeres); (2) the
lagged variables (Cmnafl, Cmwipol and Cmeresl); (3) the natural loga-
rithm of the average duration of the cases in each provider to include
the current month (Ldnaf, Ldwipo and Lderes); and (4) the lagged
variables (Ldnafl, Ldwipol and Lderesl). The results suggest that only
the complainant and variables for WIPO and eRes lagged one month.
The variables for NAF and eRes for the current month are significant
and the lagged monthly duration for WIPO is significant. Now, we
would like to see the magnitude of the impact of each variable in the
probability of selection. Table 5 shows the probabilities calculated by
the model and the effects of changing each of the explanatory variables
in one deviation standard.
TABLE 4: MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION
Model 1
Variables Coefficient Z
NAF
Cmeresl 1.956 3.013 '-'
(0.649)
Cmwipol 6.879 3.256 r'*
(2.113)
Ldnaf 
-8.014 -3.382(*'
(2.370)
Ldwipol 3.953 6.605""
(0.598)
Lderes 4.001 5.5371-1
(0.723)
Constant -6.190 -0.746
(8.296)
175. See Appendix A for the summary of the variables used in the regression analysis.
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Variables Coefficient Z
WIPO
Cmeresl 2.463 3.968 '
(0.621)
Cmwipol 3.994 1.97 3'"'
(2.024)
Ldnaf -6.967 -3.017("
(2.309)
Ldwipol 5.009 8.644"')
(0.579)
Lderes 3.879 5.433*(0.714)
Constant -11.200 -1.386
(8.081)
Number of observabons=2861 LR chi2(10)=121.78 Prob> chi2=0.0000
Log Likelihood= -2255.66 Pseudo R2= 0.0238
Coefficient tests: (***) Significant 1%; (**) Significant 5%; (*) Significant 10%
TABLE 5: PROBABILITIES MODEL I
Prob Prob Prob
(NAF) %Change (WIPO %Chan e (eRes) % Change
Total Probability 0.268 0.685 0.047
Cmeresl Increase 0.254 -5.22% 0.716 4.5% 0.030 -36.2%
Decrease 0.280 4.5% 0.650 -5.1% 0.071 51.1%
Cmwipol Increase 0.304 13.4% 0.660 -3.64% 0.036 -23.4%
Decrease 0.166 -38.1% 0.791 15.5% 0.043 -8.5%
Ldnafl Increase 0.221 -17.5% 0.658 -3.9% 0.121 157.4%
Decrease 0.307 14.6% 0.676 -5.5% 0.016 -66.0%
Ldwipol Increase 0.238 -11.2% 0.741 8.1% 0.020 -57%
Decrease 0.288 7.4% 0.608 -11.2% 0.103 120%
Lderes Increase 0.281 4.9% 0.699 2.0% 0.019 -60.0%
Decrease 0.246 -8.2% 0.647 -5.5% 0.108 129.8%
The above results suggest that there is a much higher probability of
the complainants selecting WIPO compared to NAF and eRes. This is
true for at least the period of time covered by this study, including the
period when eRes was still receiving cases. For NAF, column 1 in Ta-
ble 5, the probability of being selected is 26.8%. An increase
(decrease) in the ratio of complainants winning in eRes will slightly
increase (decrease) the probability of complainants selecting NAF.
Even though the impact is small, it is in the opposite direction. One
would expect that if there is a bias, an increase in the winning ratio of
complainants in eRes should decrease the probability of receiving a
case for NAF and WIPO. In our study, the findings suggest that an in-
crease in the bias favoring complainants by eRes will produce an
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increase in the number of complainants presented to NAF. The same
result is true for NAF in the case of a change in the complainant win-
ning ratio for WIPO. In this instance, an increase/decrease in the
complainant winning ratio for WIPO will result in an important in-
crease/decrease in the probability of cases received by NAF Again,
these results are counterintuitive to the bias thesis presented before.
An increase (decrease) in the duration of NAF procedure will de-
crease (increase) the probability of NAF receiving the next case. The
effect of this variable is more important than the effect of the bias vari-
ables. More importantly, the effect is as expected, i.e., a worsening in
the efficiency of NAF should decrease the probability of receiving the
next claim. For eRes, the changes are also as expected. A higher/lower
duration in eRes produces a higher/lower probability of selection in
NAF, thus increasing/decreasing the probability of receiving a claim.
Nonetheless, in the case of the duration variable for WIPO, the results
are counterintuitive. Specifically, an increase/decrease in the duration
for WIPO will produce a decrease/increase in the probability of receiv-
ing a case in NAF.
WIPO has the highest probability of being selected, 68.5%. In this
case, an increase/decrease in the complainant ratio in eRes will pro-
duce a slightly negative/positive effect on the probability of WIPO
being chosen.'76 The same result is observed with the changes in the
complainant ratio in WIPO.177 Accordingly, all of the results in testing
for bias in WIPO contradict the claim of the existence of such a bias.
The duration results suggest that both an increase and a decrease in the
duration of NAF will produce a negative impact on the WIPO's prob-
ability of receiving cases. Nonetheless, the negative effect is more
important when the duration of NAF procedure decreases. This is con-
sistent with the efficiency argument. In fact, the effect of its own
duration is not consistent with what we should expect. An in-
crease/decrease in the duration of WIPO will increase/decrease the
probability of receiving the next case.
The duration of eRes has the expected effect on the probability of
WIPO. The probability of eRes receiving a case is the lowest of the
three providers studied. An increase/decrease in the complainant bias
by eRes has a negative/positive effect on the probability of receiving
the next case, which is again, counterintuitive to the bias hypothesis.
That said, an increase in WIPO's bias variable results in a decrease in
176. This is again a result contrary to what should be expected.
177. These have a negative impact in WIPO probability.
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the probability of eRes being chosen as a provider, and this result is
consistent with the bias hypothesis. However, a decrease in WIPO's
bias variable does not result in an increase in the probability of eRes
being chosen as the provider, and this result is inconsistent with the
bias hypothesis. Hence, we only see partial support for the bias hy-
pothesis between WIPO and eRes.
The impact of the efficiency variable in eRes is very important. An
increase/decrease in the duration of NAF generates an important in-
crease in the probability of eRes being chosen. Thus, eRes's efficiency
results with respect to NAF are as expected. In the case of the effi-
ciency variable for WIPO, the results are not consistent with the
efficiency hypothesis. In other words, an increase/decrease in WIPO's
efficiency does not result in a decrease/increase in the probability of
being chosen for the other providers, suggesting that WIPO is being
chosen by complainants for reasons unrelated to duration, such as geo-
graphical considerations, or, initially, for its UDRP experience since it
is the earliest UDRP provider.
Table 6 shows how the bias and efficiency hypotheses perform in
our econometric model. Table 6 shows the expected and actual signs
for changes in the probability of being chosen as a provider corre-
sponding to increases or decreases in the explanatory bias and
efficiency variables. The signs when there is agreement between the
actual and expected changes are shown in parentheses in Table 6. The
results illustrate that bias variables produced partial results, with just
one instance where the signs completely match those expected (the
case of changes in the complainant bias in eRes and its impact on NAF
being chosen is consistent with the bias hypothesis). However, in ana-
lyzing the efficiency variables, the results are as expected in all the
cases for NAF and eRes. The only variable that is not according to
what we expected is the efficiency measurement for WIPO. Hence, the
performance of the providers can be considered a better measure in
determining the selection of the providers by the complainants than the
supposed bias of the system favoring complainants. Accordingly, in
contrast to most of the empirical papers about the UDRP system based
on general results and supporting the bias theory, our paper examines
the performance of the providers and how differences among them af-
fect the UDRP results. In actuality, because performance is an
important determinant of provider success, performance should receive
more attention than the supposed system bias.
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TABLE 6: EXPECTED AND ACTUAL RESULTS
Variables NAF WIPO ERes
Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual
Cmeresl Increase 0 + +
Decrease + W+) + +
Cmwipol Increase + + 0-)
Decrease + + +
Ldnafl Increase 0 + 0 + (+)
Decrease + I W 1
Ldwipol Increase + + + -
Decrease + + +
Lderes Increase + W + +)(-)
Decrease 0 + W
B. How Important is Efficiency for Analyzing Provider Performance?
According to the analysis from the previous section, each provider
for the UDRP system has to evaluate and decide each complaint.'78 The
two main characteristics of this alternative dispute resolution system are
low cost and quick results. The low cost of presenting a complaint is
relatively uniform across providers. ICANN attempted to generate a
simple set of rules for processing each complaint designed to create a
shortened administrative process. By providing common rules for the
process, ICANN sought to avoid both excessive differentiation among
providers as well as forum shopping. Despite these efforts, the providers
can still find ways to attract more complainants than their competitors.
First, given that it is the complainant who chooses the provider, a bias
favoring complainants would help attract complaints toward this pro-
vider. This effect has been widely analyzed in literature but, as illustrated
in the previous sections, is not the main determinant used by complain-
ants in selecting a provider. Second, providers can increase business by
shaping their supplemental rules to be more efficient than those of other
providers. Supplemental rules do not vary much among providers. Third,
although prices are similar among providers, competitive prices could
attract more complainants. This effect is similar to other oligopolist in-
dustries where producers do not compete with prices but with customer
service.
Most of these variables will determine the speed of the process,
which in the end is one of the main characteristics of the system and re-
lated to the success of the provider in the long run. The time that it takes
178. See Sections II and Ill.
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to evaluate and decide each complaint depends on a number of instru-
ments the provider has on hand.
First, bias for or against some group will alter the process, and there-
fore, also affect timing. For example, if a given provider favors people
from a given country, then all the complaints or responses coming from
this country will be treated differently and, as a consequence, will be
resolved at a different speed.
Second, differences in the supplemental rules, and/or internal proce-
dure for each provider will determine the capacity of a certain provider
to review the complaints efficiently. For example, if a provider has cre-
ated simple rules with good incentives for both complainants and
respondents to submit accurate and on time information, then the resolu-
tions of the cases will be faster.
Third, the type of complaints and procedure will have an impact on
the speed of the process. For example, if the respondent fails to submit a
defense for its case, the panelist will then be in a position to reach a
faster decision.
Fourth, the panelists the provider appoints and their specific back-
ground and precedence will have an impact on the speed of the results.
For example, a panelist from India will be more knowledgeable about
property laws in India and better equipped to quickly handle a case in-
volving parties from India than a case with parties coming from the
European Union.
Fifth, the geographical origin of the parties should have an impact on
the speed of the resolution of the conflict. Differences in law, language,
customs, etc. will be a barrier to a smooth and fast resolution in each
case. This is one of the main barriers a universal system like the UDRP
has to be able to overcome in order to be successful in the long run. As a
result, the duration of the procedure will be influenced by the many in-
struments each provider has available to improve their efficiency and
share of cases. Accordingly, we can represent the speed of the procedure
as,
d = D(Bias, Rules, Type, Panelists, Parties) (4)
where:
Bias is the specific preference the provider has with respect to some
specific group. Rules are the differences in the procedure and rules of
each provider. Type is the type and complexity of each complaint. Panel-
ists represent individual characteristics of each panelist. Parties represent
the precedence of each party
In the previous equation, the duration of the procedure will depend
on the series of variables under the control of the provider. The analysis
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of this duration function will help to determine the differences between
providers and the different factors that explain the performance of the
UDRP system. Accordingly, our analysis departs from most of the em-
pirical studies of the UDRP. Although other studies have attempted to
determine the bias of the system in favor of complainants and the general
characteristics of the providers, our analysis goes a step beyond that and
examines the determinants of the duration of the process.
We use duration models to test the performance of each provider and
the system as a whole. Duration models are widely used in medicine and
labor economics to measure the expected length of an event. In labor
economics, researchers have measured the expected duration for a strike
by using models to measure the probability that the strike will be main-
tained an extra day. Accordingly, we use the model where once a trial
begins, there is a probability that it will be terminated the next day or
else it will continue to be analyzed by the respective provider.
Data
We use two different databases for the four providers, WIPO, NAF,
eRes, and CPR, for the period from January 2000 to November 2002.
The first database utilized in this section was obtained from the UDRP
web site and contains 7148 cases from January 2000 to November 2002.
The cases are separated by provider and by the duration, in days, of each
case. The second database was obtained from the work of the Conver-
gence Center.7 9 This database contains a series of variables for the first
3850 cases from December 1999 to July 2001.80 From this database we
have been able to compile a series of different variables as described in
Appendix B.
C. Results
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the total number of cases presented
in each month. There was a sharp increase in the number of complaints
presented during the initial months of 2000, possibly a consequence of
the implementation of the UDRP regime. 8' Starting in August 2000 and
179. See Convergence Center, Current Projects, at http://dcc.syr.edu/projectlist.htm
180. See Convergence Center, The UDRP Tracking Project, at http://dcc.syr.edu/
marklepage.htm
181. "If we examine when the names challenged under the UDRP were registered, we
find a significant concentration of challenged names in the first quarter of 2000... The first
quarter of 2000 stands out as a huge peak. The period was too early for the UDRP to have a
significant deterrent effect on cybersquatters, yet immediately followed ICANN's introduction
of registrar competition which stimulated the marketing and consumption of gTLD domains.
The number of disputed names drops off precipitously in the second and third quarters of
2000." Mueller, supra note 36, at 5.
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throughout 2001, the number of cases steadily decreased. In 2002, there
was a small increase in the number of cases from March to June, but af-
terwards the number of cases continued to decline.
The declining number of cases is the consequence of two main fac-
tors. First, because most of the disputes associated with earlier domain
names were already settled during 2000 and 2001, the incoming number
of new disputes was much lower. Furthermore, the existence of the
UDRP system may act as a deterrent for users engaged in mass registra-
tion of names or for those looking to make quick profits by registering
proprietary names and brands of others. Second, the economic downturn
of technology-related economic activities, especially in respect to e-
commerce, could have impacted the number of complaints and disputes
for domain names.
The number of disputes will likely increase in the future, as the
Internet increasingly expands into a more international environment and
becomes more popular in other countries outside of the United States
and the European Union. Between January 2000 and June 2003, the
UDRP has evaluated 8,549 cases, and most of them have been divided
among two main providers, NAF and WIPO (Figure 3). As Figure 3 il-
lustrates, WIPO and NAF have decided 95.5% of the cases. The closest
competitor, with just 3.3%, eRes, is no longer a provider for the UDRP
regime.
Examining the evolution of the number of cases received by each
provider over time shows how the system has evolved around two main
providers (Figure 4). During the first year, the dominance of WIPO, an
active participant in the process of delineating the UDRP, is apparent.
Accordingly, the number of cases received by WIPO (60% of the total)
strongly surpassed those of NAF (32%), eRes (7.6%) and CPR (0.7%).
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FIGURE 2
UDRP NUMBER OF CASES PER MONTH
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Month
Source: Own Elaboration based on data on UDRP cases at www.icann.org
FIGURE 3
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FIGURE 4
UDRP NUMBER OF CASES BY PROVIDER
Month
Source: Own Elaboration based on data on UDRP cases at www.icann.org
FIGURE 5
DURATION OF CASES BY MONTH
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Source: Own Elaboration based on data on UDRP cases at www.icann.org
In the second year, there was still a tendency for WIPO to receive
more cases than NAF. Although WIPO received 60% of the cases, NAF
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increased its participation to 37%. NAF's increased participation was
due to a reduction in the number of cases handled by eRes to 3.4%.
Meanwhile, CPR remained at 0.6%. In 2002, the tendency changed as a
result of a convergence in the number of cases between NAF and WIPO.
NAF increased its participation to 46% and WIPO decreased its partici-
pation to 52%. At the same time, eRes went out of business in the end of
2001, and CPR continued to have an insignificant share. In 2002,
ADNDRC was created, but it managed just 0.8% of the total number of
cases. In 2003, the tendency continued with the two main providers po-
larizing the cases. WIPO received 50% of the cases, NAF 46%, CPR
1.6% and ADNDRC 2%. At this time, the system seems to have reached
equilibrium with two main providers receiving an almost similar quan-
tity of cases.
In the future, ADNDRC will increase its number of cases to reflect
its exclusive geographic region of operations. The actual duration of
cases from month to month suggests that there were almost no differ-
ences in the duration of the cases over time (Figure 5). There were,
however, some outliers at the initial stages of the system. But, most of
the months show average similar values for the duration. In the next sec-
tion we present the econometric results on the performance of the UDRP
system.
The predominance of the United States and Europe is present in the
geographic distribution of cases (Table 7). Moreover, we considered both
the origin of complainants and respondents in each case in our database
from December 1999 to July 2001. A higher proportion of complainants
come from developed countries in Europe, the United States, Canada
and Japan, which represent 80% of all the complaints. On the other
hand, these same countries represent 73% of all the respondents. This
increase in the number of respondents in developing countries could be
consistent with the lack of both secure trademark protection and cyber
squatting enforcement (Table 7).
Interestingly, in classifying the cases of each provider with respect to
the geographic origin of the complainants, the complaints of the NAF
(83%) and CPR (76%) came mainly from their host country, the United
States (Figure 6).
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TABLE 7
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF COMPLAINANTS
AND RESPONDENTS
Respondents Number Percentage Complainants Number Percentage
United States 1,983 51.5 United States 2,124 55.1
Great Britain 201 5.2 Great Britain 206 5.3
Canada 153 4.0 France 121 3.1
Spain 134 3.5 Spain 113 2.9
Republic of Korea 107 2.8 Canada 104 2.7
Australia 67 1.7 Germany 89 2.3
Italy 50 1.3 Italy 64 1.7
France 41 1.1 Australia 49 1.3
India 35 0.9 India 48 1.2
Sweden 34 0.9 Japan 46 1.2
China 34 0.9 Netherlands 44 1.1
Russia 30 0.8 Switzerland 42 1.1
Switzerland 29 0.8 Sweden 40 1.0
Germany 27 0.7 Brazil 34 0.9
Ireland 24 0.6 Other European 104 2.7
Brazil 23 0.6 Asia 60 1.6
Hong Kong 22 0.6 Rest of Latin America 58 1.5
Netherlands 21 0.5 Africa 17 0.4
Japan 16 0.4 Middle East 10 0.3
Africa 7 0.2 Unknown 480 12.5
Rest of Latin America 101 2.6
Rest of Europe 74 1.9
Rest Asia 69 1.8
Middle East 61 1.6
Unknown 510 13.2
Total 3,853 100.0 3,853 100.0
United States 1,983 51.5 United States 2,124 55.1
Europe 665 17.3 Europe 823 21.4
Latin America and North 277 7.2 Latin America and 196 5.1
America North America
Asia 350 9.1 Asia 203 5.3
Middle East 61 1.6 Middle East 10 0.3
Africa 7 0.2 Africa 17 0.4
Unknown 510 13.2 Unknown 480 12.5
Total 3,853 100.0 3,853 100.0
Source: Own elaboration based on Convergence Center database
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Although the dominant country of origin for Swiss-based WIPO is
also the United States with 41%, Europe accounts for 32% of WIPO's
cases. This is substantially larger than the 4% and 15% European cases
represent for the US providers. Additionally, eRes received 44 % of its
cases from the United States, 26% from Canada, and 10% from
Europe. The rest of the regions of the world participate marginally in
each of these providers, though WIPO is the recipient of the majority
of these claims. Furthermore, duration also varies across providers and
regions, and NAF is much faster than WIPO in all the different regions
(Figure 6).
Some of the cases decided by the UDRP providers have been chal-
lenged in the United States courts. We identified a total of fifteen such
cases since the inception of the UDRP regime. Of these cases, nine
were handled by WIPO, five by NAF, and one by eRes. In three of
these cases, the federal court reversed in total the UDRP providers' de-
cision. In four cases, it reversed the decision in part. In eight cases, it
affirmed the providers' decisions. In one case, the court declared that it
did not have jurisdiction because the case involved a government from
another country.
FIGURE 6
DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BY ORIGIN OF COMPLAINANT
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FIGURE 6 (CONTINUED)
DURATION OF CASES BY ORIGIN: NAF
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D. Econometric Results
In this section, we present the factors that determine the expected
number of days that a case is under review. The duration variable is ex-
tremely important because, as we have shown, it is one of the main
variables providers can manage in order to achieve their goal of having
complainants select them. With the results obtained based on the database
covering the months from January 2000 to November 2002 we would like
to answer two main questions. First, what are the general duration charac-
teristics of the system as a whole? Second, are there differences in
duration among providers? The first question will help to describe the pro-
cedure and determine the expected duration of the system as a whole.
Forum shopping is the goal of the second question.
One of the main objectives of ICANN is to establish a system with
many private providers and a common set of rules and regulations. How-
ever, because the complainant picks the provider, differences among them
may include a bias that could be exploited by the complainants. Conse-
quently, the duration depends on many factors and characteristics of each
provider and is also different for each provider.
Although the structural differences among providers results in forum
shopping opportunities, we have shown that duration is the most signifi-
cant factor influencing choice of provider. Thus if the duration functions
can be made statistically the same among providers, the ICANN system
would be successful in providing a homogeneous system for dispute reso-
lution on the Internet. Figure 7 illustrates the Kaplan-Meyer survival
function. This function allows us to analyze the performance of the entire
system. The horizontal axis measures the duration of the cases in days,
and the vertical axis shows the probability of surviving one extra day. Ac-
cordingly, the expected mean duration for the whole system is 54 days
(Table 8). Furthermore, the results of the different probabilities of survival
are: up to 31 days the probability of survival is higher than 90%; up to 40
days it is higher than 70%; for a duration of 47 days the probability is
higher than 50%; the probability of survival is higher than 30% for dura-
tion above 56 days; and finally, for duration of up to 83 days, the
probability of survival is at least 10%. These results suggest that the sys-
tem is providing a relatively fast procedure for evaluating complaints,
because the median duration is just 47 days for the system as a whole.
The second question considers the importance of the differences in
duration among providers. Figure 8 shows the results obtained by drawing
a different survival function for each provider. A simple inspection of Fig-
ure 8 suggests that there are two extreme providers, NAF with the lowest
duration function and WIPO with the highest duration function. The other
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providers are located somewhere in between these two extremes and are
the ones that polarize the number of complaints of the whole system.
In order to determine the statistical differences among duration curves,
we use a set of tests designed to compare survival functions. The tests are
the log-rank test, the Wilcoxon test, and the Cox test. Table 9 shows the
values for these tests, which support the contention that the duration func-
tions between providers are statistically different. This result is very
important because there are differences in the structure and procedure of
each of the providers that provide the possibility of forum shopping under
the UDRP system. Furthermore, the duration function, and consequently
the technology function, is different for each court. In the next section, we
will analyze the factors that determine this difference in duration among
providers.
E. Duration Analysis by Provider
In the previous section, we showed that the duration functions for
each provider are different and, therefore, should be evaluated separately.
In this section, we will analyze the different factors behind the specific
structure of each provider and how these factors produce a different du-
ration function. Accordingly, we use a Cox semi-parametric duration
model for the analysis of the cases in each provider. This model will al-
low us to introduce independent variables to explain the differences in
behavior in each provider, without imposing any specific structure on the
hazard function.
FIGURE 7
KAPLAN-MEYER SURVIVAL ESTIMATE
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3"
0.2
0.1
0 -
20 40 60 80
Days
100 120 140
Spring 20051
344 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 11:285
TABLE 8: DURATION CHARACTERISTICS
Category Total Mean Min Median Max
no. of subjects 7,330
no. of records 7,330 1 1 1 1
(first) entry time 0 0 0 0
(final) exit time 54.368 1 47 856
subjects with gap 0
time on gap if gap 0
time at risk 398,521 54.368 1 47 856
Failures 7,148 10.975 1.0 1 11
FIGURE 8
KAPLAN-MEYER SURVIVAL ESTIMATE BY PROVIDER
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TABLE 9: TESTS OF EQUALITY OF SURVIVAL CURVES
Cox Regression-Based Test
Provider Observed Expected Hazard
NAF 2731 1740.85 1.674
WIPO 4079 5110.42 0.830
eRes 286 246.24 1.223
CPR 52 50.48 1.081
Total 7148 7148 1.000
LR Chi'(4)=734.45 Prob. Chi'--0.000
Log-Rank Test
Provider Observed Expected
NAF 2731 1740.85
WIPO 4079 5110.43
Eres 286 246.24
CPR 52 50.48
Total 7148 7148
Chi2(3)=834.61 Prob. Chi 2--0.0000
Wilcoxon Test
Provider Observed Expected Sum of Ranks
NAF 2731 1740.85 5440025
WIPO 4079 5110.43 -5562113
Eres 286 246.24 126492
CPR 52 50.48 -4404
Total 7148 7148 0
Chi2(3)=1 131.40 Prob. Chi 2=0.0000
In order to analyze the structure of each provider, we utilize the data-
base constructed by Mueller that contains more than 3000 cases compiled
during 2000-2001.182 Table 10 shows the differences between each pro-
vider in terms of duration based on the Kaplan-Meier estimator.'83 WIPO
is the provider with the greatest expected duration, a mean duration of 57
days and a median duration of 51 days. The fastest provider is NAF, with a
mean duration of 38 days and a median of 35. This difference between the
providers located at the extremes is very important. WIPO takes 48%
more than the average time expected under NAF. In fact, even when NAF
concentrates most of its efforts on cases in the United States, NAF has a
consistently shorter duration than WIPO (Figures 8 and 9). The same
behavior is observed with respect to eRes and CPR, which, in general,
are faster than WIPO, but slower than NAF (Figure 9).
Table 10 presents the variables that best explain the behavior of each
of the providers based on the Cox model. After running a general model
182. See Appendix C for a complete list of the variables used in this analysis.
183. These results are based on the different duration functions calculated in the previ-
ous section for each provider.
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for each provider we tested for the fulfillment of the main assumption of
the Cox model, the proportional hazard assumption.'84 The test results
suggested that the variables for some of the panelists included in our
models did not pass the proportional hazard tests. For these judges, the
structure of the duration function is different than for the rest of the pro-
vider's cases.
FIGURE 9
AVERAGE DURATION BY PROVIDER AND REGION
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184. See Appendix D for the complete presentation of the results.
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TABLE 10
CHARACTERISTICS OF DURATION FUNCTIONS
FOR EACH PROVIDER
WIPO CPR
Category Total Mean Min Median Max Category Total Mean Min Median Max
no. of subjects 1,999 no. of subjects 25
no. of records 1,999 1 1 1 1 no. of records 25 1 1 1 1
(first) entry time 0 0 0 0 (first) entry time 0 0 0 0
(final) exit time 57.39 6 51 420 (final) exit time 46.32 20 43 72
Subjects with subjects with
gap gap 0
time on gap if time on gap if
0ap  ap 0
timeatrisk 114,719 57.39 6 51 420 timeat risk 1158 46.32 20 43 72
Failures 1,999 1 1 1 1 Failures 25 1 1 1 1
NAF e-Res
Category Total Mean Min Median Max Category Total Mean Min Median Max
no. of subjects 1,123 no. of subjects 209
no. of records 1,123 1 1 1 1 no. of records 209 1 1 1 1
(first) entry time 0 1 1 1 (first) entry time 0 0 0 0
(final) exit time 38.73 4 35 407 (final) exit time 47.84 20 44 130
subjects with subjects with
gap 0 gap 0
time on gap if time on gap if
gap 0 gap 0
Itime at risk 43,489 38.73 4 35 407 time at risk 9999 47.84 20 44 130
Failures 1,123 1 1 1 1 Failures 209 1 1 1 1
The results of Table 11 indicate some curious results. For WIPO,
the following variables have a positive impact on the duration function,
implying a faster resolution of the cases and a lower probability of sur-
vival: Default, Respse, Compse, Compca, Complaw, Dorf, P., and
Limbury, A.
The variables that have a negative impact, implying a longer reso-
lution time, are: Split, Respus, Compus, Compin, and Bernstein.
Default represents those complaints where the respondent does not re-
ply to the charges of the complainant. Split represents those cases
where the panel has a split decision. The positive sign implies that the
panelists have less trouble in quickly deciding these types of cases; the
cases are generally decided in favor of the complainant. The negative
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impact on the duration is because of the time needed by the panel to
decide the case.185
Judicial represents those cases in which the panelists reviewed pre-
vious cases in order to reach a decision. The positive sign for this
variable indicates that as the panelist, or panelists, find cases similar to
the one they were considering, the panel will need less time to decide
the case.
The variables Respus and Compus represent cases in which both
the respondent and the complainant are from the United States. Be-
cause the effect of both variables is negative, we can conclude that a
negative bias exists with respect to claims or responses coming from
the United States. 86 The same effect is present for Compin, which
represents complainants coming from India. Alternately, the variables
Respse and Compse represent cases where the respondent, the claim-
ant, or both, are from Switzerland. For these variables, the coefficient
is positive. A positive coefficient indicates that, on average, the WIPO
panels take less time to resolve disputes having a positive bias toward
Switzerland. Because the geographical headquarters of WIPO is in Ge-
neva, Switzerland, this effect could be due to a more comprehensive
knowledge of laws and institutions of the country. We observe the same
effect for the variable, Compca, which represents claims where the
complainant is from Canada.
The presence of either positive or negative bias acts as a general
negative indicator of the performance of the provider. Bias implies that
the provider is not up to the task of generating a universal and objective
dispute resolution system for the Internet.
185. Usually, split cases are more difficult to resolve, causing the panel to spend more
time on them.
186. A negative bias exists in the sense that the panel is taking more time to decide the
cases.
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TABLE I I
Cox SEMI-PARAMETRIC DURATION MODEL
WIPO NAF CPR eRes
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient
Default 1.238 Default 1.411 Default 1.914
(0.05767) (0.09149) (0.29431)
Split 0.530 Respru 2.400 Split 41.193 Employee 2.608
(0.08911) (0.43334) (53.71631) (0.68328)
Respus 0.907 Compde 2.069 Ascomp 18.704 Namecan 5.748
(0.04657) (1.0989) (30.42342) (3.66312)
Respse 1.650 Compnac 3.908 Asresp 4.418 Respciii 3.408
(0.34673) (1.76611) (2.229) (1.81084)
.ompus 0.882 Complaw 1.106 Compca 0.739
(0.04643) (0.04206) (0.10688)
Compse 1.468
(0.32872)
Compin 0.679
(0.10055)
Compca 1.518
(0.24300)
Judicial 1.085
(0.03865)
Buchele, J. 1 Buchele, J. 2.640 Buchele, J. 8.763 Buchele, J. 9.317
(0.40042) (6.425) (3.21267)
Carmody, J. 1 Carmody, J. 1 Carmody, J. 14.829
(4.83655)
Dor, P. 2.672
(0.70459)
Johnson,C. 1
Kalina, H. 1 Kalina, H. 2.322
(0.30927)
Yachnin, R. 1 Yachnin, R. 1 Yachnin, R. 22.241
(6.26071)
Limbury, A. 1.779
(0.38403)
Bernstein 0.684
(0.08541)
Nr 1996 1119 25 209
Observations
Nr Failures 1996 1119 25 209
Time at risk 114471 43313 1158 9999
Wald 135.8 156.61 11.46 154.87
Chi2(df) (df=12) (df=7) (df=4) (df=8)
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.0219 0.000
Chi2 I
Log -12292.70 -6141.25 -53.40 -884.87
Likelihood I II I
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All of the panelists except one have a positive impact on the duration
function. 7 This implies that the panelists, having received the highest
number of cases, proceed with the cases with certain independence. Fur-
thermore, for WIPO, panelists Buchele, Carmody, Johnson, Kalina, and
Yachnin not only have a positive impact on the duration function, but
also lack the same assumed proportional hazard for all the cases. This
implies that these panelists do not follow the same general procedures as
other WIPO panelists. Figure 10 shows the differences in the duration
function between these panelists and the rest of the cases. Figure 11 also
shows the differences in hazard functions. 8 Although in all cases the
hazard function appears to be exponential, indicating that the cases face
an increasing probability of being solved, this hazard is still higher for
the panelists under analysis.
Table 12 shows the different duration for each panelist under differ-
ent probabilities of survival. The different results indicate the importance
of the effect specific panelists can have on the system. Accordingly, the
selection procedure for the panelists is not innocuous. Because the pro-
vider selects the president of the panel, or in the case of sole panels,
selects the arbitrator in charge, the differences between the panelists can
have important implications for the results of the cases.
Table 13 illustrates how the types of cases received by the judges
along with the verdict they render are significantly different from the rest
of the panelists and the provider system as a whole. The t-statistics sug-
gest that there is no difference in the results between these panelists and
the rest of the cases. Therefore, WIPO's optimal behavior is to rely on
these panelists, who are fastest, in order to improve the performance of
the provider and attract more complainants. In the next section, we will
explore the performance of judges across providers.
187. In our initial model we considered all panelists for the four providers that partici-
pated in at least twenty cases. However, the ones showed in the econometric results are those
that have a statistically significant impact on the duration function.
188. A hazard function shows the probability that a given process will end in any defined
period of time. For example, in our case that hazard function will show the probability that
any case being adjudicated by a given provider will end the following day. See RUSSELL
DAVIDSON AND JAMES MACKINNON, ECONOMETRIC THEORY AND METHODS 489-95 (2004)
(describing general duration models).
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FIGURE 10
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TABLE 12
WIPO, DURATION FOR EACH PANELIST
Probability of
Survival All Cases Buchele, J. Carmody, J. Johnson, C. Katina, H. Yachnin, R.
0.9 38 28 29 34 30 24
0.7 45 32 32 36 33 31
0.5 53 38 37 40 35 34
0.3 64 43 42 42 41 37
0.1 87 60 55 54 48 43
TABLE 13
WIPO RESULTS OF CASES BY TYPE OF JUDGES
Type of Respondent
Unaffi/i Licensee Competit Employee Criticor Unknown
3ernstein 0.72 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05
-imbury, A. 0.76 0.03 0.17 0.03
Yachnin, R. 0.75 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05
Kalina, H. 0.92 0.08
Johnson, C. 0.70 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.07
Dorf, P. 0.88 0.04 0.08
armody, J. 0.86 0.04 0.04 0.06
uchele, J. 0.75 0.08 0.04 0.13
Total Panelists 1 0.78 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.05
bbot, F 0.70 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.09
Barker, L. 0.82 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02
Donahey, M. 0.78 0.02 0.12 0.08
Samuels, J. 0.89 0.05 0.05
Page, R. 0.72 0.15 0.05 0.08
Foster, D. 0.78 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.03
Bianchi, R. 0.69 0.14 0.17
Total Panelists2 0.77 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.07
Rest of Cases 0.66 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.20
T-Test Panelistsl vs Panelists2 0.9870 0.4790 -0.4510 0.9180 -1.8000
Probability 0.3617 0.6792 0.6756 0.4557 0.2136
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TABLE 13 (CONTINUED)
Type of Response Panel Decision
Default Lateresp Transfer Dismiss Termin Namecan Split
ernstein 0.38 0.69 0.26 0.03 0.03
Limbury, A. 0.41 0.69 0.28 0.03
Yachnin, R. 0.50 0.80 0.20
Kalina, H. 0.58 0.83 0.13 0.04
Johnson, C. 0.40 0.69 0.28 0.01 0.01
Doff, R 0.69 0.92 0.04 0.04
Carmody, J. 0.57 0.02 0.90 0.10
Euchele, J. 0.50 0.83 0.08 0.08
Total Panelists 1 0.49 0.00 0.78 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.01
Abbot, F. 0.40 0.70 0.30
Barker, L. 0.40 0.02 0.71 0.24 0.04
Donahey, M. 0.55 0.82 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.02
Samuels, J. 0.47 0.84 0.16
Page, R. 0.36 0.03 0.69 0.28 0.03
Foster, D. 0.34 0.03 0.66 0.31 0.03
Bianchi, R. 0.59 0.76 0.07 0.17
Total Panelists 2 0.44 0.01 0.74 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.01
Rest of Cases 0.43 0.01 0.67 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.01
-Test Panelistsl vs Panelists2 1.1500 - 1.1760 -0.5440 - -
Probability 0.2940 0.2843 0.6062
Each of NAF's variables has a positive impact on the Survival
function, i.e., these variables decrease the expected duration of the
cases. Default and Complaw have a positive effect, thereby decreasing
the duration of the review process. Respru, Compde, and Compnac cor-
respond to the bias for certain complainants or responses coming from
specific countries. Respru, representing those respondents coming from
Russia, has a lower resolution time. Compde and Compnac are the
variables for the complainants from Germany and North America.
Complainants from Germany and North America receive a faster reso-
lution of their cases as compared with other complainants. For North
American complainants, the bias could be the consequence of the geo-
graphical location of NAF in the United States and the high proportion
of panelists also from the United States. This type of bias could present
a problem for reaching a homogeneous system of dispute resolution in
the Internet. In summary, fewer of these panelists have specific dura-
tion functions when compared with WIPO.
Only two panelists, Carmody, J. and Yachnin, R. do not fit in the
proportional hazard assumption of the general model. The survival and
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hazard functions for these two panelists are shown in Figures 12 and
13. Similar to the previous results, these panelists are much faster in
resolving cases than the rest of the judges for NAF. Moreover, although
the hazard functions are much steeper for both panelists, the hazard
functions are exponential. Table 14 shows the difference in duration for
specific probabilities of failure.
Table 15 illustrates the data and t-statistics that help to determine if
the resulting verdicts of the panelists are significantly different from
other panelists. Clearly, there are no major differences among panel-
ists, with the exception that the panelists with a different hazard
received a higher number of cases where the respondent was in default.
Of interest is that the all the judges that managed a relatively large
number of cases have produced a higher proportion of verdicts favoring
the complainant.' 9
FIGURE 12
NAF: SURVIVAL FUNCTIONS BY JUDGES
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The variable Transfer is much higher for the panelist selected than for the rest of the
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FIGURE 13
NAF: HAZARD FUNCTIONS BY JUDGES
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TABLE 14
NAF, DURATION FOR EACH PANELIST
Probability All Cases Carmody, J. Yachnin, R.
0.9 30 25 23
0.7 35 28 27
0.5 39 31 30
0.3 43 33 32
0.1 59 40 35
TABLE 15
NAF RESULTS PER PANELISTS
Type of Respondent
Unaffili Licensee Competit Employee Criticor Unknown
Buchele, J. 0.74 0.05 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.02
Carmody, J. 0.81 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.03
Kalina, H. 0.73 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.03
Yachnin, R. 0.86 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03
Total Panelists 1 0.80 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.03
Bemstein 0.89 0.11
Bianchi, R. 0.84 0.05 0.05 0.05
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Type of Respondent
Unaffili Licensee Competit Employee Criticor Unknown
oster, D. 0.65 0.29 0.06
_imbury, A. 0.61 0.11 0.11 0.17
PageR. 0.90 0.10
Samuels, J. 0.86 0.07 0.00 0.07
Johnson, C. 0.63 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.02
Dorf, P. 0.65 0.10 0.13 0.13
Donahey, M. 0.60 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
3arker, L. 0.65 0.04 0.22 0.09
k bot, F 0.64 0.07 0.14 0.14
Total Panelists 2 0.69 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.01
Rest of Cases 0.58 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.18
" test Panelists 1 and 2 0.9794 -0.9324 -0.1253 -1.4330 -0.1676 0.6169
robability 0.3453 0.3681 0.9022 0.1755 0.8695 0.5480
Type of Response Type of Decision
Default Lateresp Transfer Dismiss Termin Namecan Split
Juez 36 0.60 0.00 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
Carmody, J. 0.73 0.00 0.93 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00
Kalina, H. 0.52 0.03 0.76 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
Yachnin, R. 0.71 0.01 0.90 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00
Total Panelists 1 0.67 0.01 0.89 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00
Bernstein 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bianchi, R. 0.58 0.00 0.89 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00
Foster, D. 0.47 0.00 0.82 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
Limbury, A. 0.50 0.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
Page, R. 0.60 0.00 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Samuels, J. 0.57 0.00 0.79 0.14 0.00 0.07 0.00
Johnson, C. 0.40 0.00 0.71 0.27 0.00 0.02 0.00
Dorf, P. 0.52 0.00 0.77 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.00
Donahey, M. 0.30 0.00 0.80 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00
Barker, L. 0.57 0.00 0.87 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
Abbot, F 0.64 0.00 0.64 0.21 0.00 0.14 0.00
Total Panelists 2 0.50 0.00 0.80 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.00
Rest of Cases 0.38 0.00 0.64 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.01
T test Panelists 1
and 2 2.2583 0.7457 -2559.0000 -0.2553
Probability 0.0418 0.4691 0.8020 0.8025
All the variables of the CPR have a positive impact on the duration
function; the variables reduce the expected evaluation time for the cases.
Strangely, even the cases where the panel had a divided opinion, Split,
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had a positive coefficient. We should ordinarily expect that the cases
having a split decision should be more difficult. This is the only factor,
among the different characteristics of the cases and the proofs presented,
that has an impact on the duration of the cases. Ascomp and Asresp both
have positive signs, implying a faster resolution for cases in which the
respondent and/or the complainant come from Asia. This represents a
geographical bias for this provider.
Although Buchele, J. is the only panelist that has a positive impact
on the duration function, Buchele, J. stays within the same proportional
hazard function as the rest of the cases for the provider. Figures 14 and
15 illustrate the survival and hazard functions for CPR.'9°
For eRes, all of the variables have a positive sign except for Comp-
can. As expected, Default has a positive effect on reducing case duration.
Employee, which represents those cases where the respondent is an em-
ployee of the complainant, has a positive sign. This implies a faster
resolution rate for those cases. In reality, it is easier to solve for variables
representing the final decision of the panel.' 9'
The provider resolved cases especially fast when the respondent pre-
sented proof of its rights over the domain name according to the rule
4.c.iii of the UDRP (variable Respciii in the model).'9 This could be
proof of a general bias within eRes in favor of respondents, in contrast
with WIPO and NAF, whose systems were more receptive to the presen-
tation of proof by complainants.
190. The hazard function is exponential, meaning that cases have an increasing rate of
being solved.
191. Those cases in which the panel decided that the name should be changed have been
solved more rapidly.
192. See Appendix A.
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FIGURE 14
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FIGURE i6
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The variable Compca represents those claims where the complainant
is from Canada and has a negative sign, implying a longer duration. This
bias suggests that the panel of eRes devoted more time to analyzing
complaints coming from Canada. Not surprisingly, eRes' headquarters is
in Quebec, Canada.
. Three of the panelists had a positive sign. This decreased the ex-
pected duration. None of these variables violate the assumption of a
proportional hazard function. Figures 16 and 17 illustrate the survival
and hazard functions for eRes.
Finally, those variables that are not included in the results because
they are not statistically significant are nonetheless important. We found
that it does not matter which type of respondent we have in each case,
for only employees for the case of NAF have an impact on the results.
This is an important attribute of the UDRP system because the relation-
ship of the parties in a case should have no bearing on the eventual
decision. Additionally, we observed several key features of the UDRP
system: (1) the respondent delivering its response late does not effect the
duration model; (2) the number of late response cases is low, only 48; (3)
it is not significant that the complainant and respondent are from differ-
ent countries; (4) with the exception of eRes, the presentation of proof
supporting the complainant or the respondent does not speed up the
case; '93 and (5) all the countries and panelists that are not included in the
econometric model were eliminated because of their lack of statistically
significant results.
1. Panelists across Providers
Although some panelists are influenced by providers, other panelists
are completely independent of providers' influence.' 94 To see if these
panelists behave in a similar fashion regardless of the provider they are
working for, in this section we evaluate the performance of the panelists
across providers. If panelists have a similar duration function regardless
of the provider they work for, then the panelists are totally independ-
ent.1 95 On the other hand, if panelists act differently for different
193. See Appendix A (describing the UDRP rules for providing evidence for complain-
ants and respondents).
194. "In some UDRP cases, arbitration panelists may ignore critical aspects of the pol-
icy, define the criteria in the UDRP so broadly that they become meaningless. Some level
variation among individual arbitrators based on their experience, their views of trademark
laws and varying interpretations of the facts should be expected." Brooks, supra note 21, at
323.
195. This would mean that the institutional structure of the provider did not influence
their activities.
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providers, then the institutional arrangement of the different providers
becomes very important in determining the procedure and, ultimately,
the efficiency and speed of the entire system.
In this analysis, we determined that the differences among providers
affect the performance of the system. In our analysis, we used four pan-
elists that received cases from two providers: Buchele, J., Kalina, H.,
Carmody, J. and Yachnin, R. Figure 18 compares the survival function
for each of these panelists using the different providers. In most of the
cases there are notable differences in the survival functions. These dif-
ferences are more easily seen in Table 16, which shows the duration for
different probabilities of survival. Table 16 suggests that NAF has a
more efficient mechanism to handle claims. Accordingly, the same pan-
elists are faster in NAF than they are in WIPO.' 96
FIGURE 18
SURVIVAL FUNCTION PANELIST BUCHELE
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196. If we take each panelist and run a Cox proportional model, we find that one of the
most important variables that explain the duration is the provider under which the panclist is
analyzing the claim.
Spring 20051
362 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 11:285
SURVIVAL FUNCTION PANELIST KALINA
20 30 40 50 60
Days
70 80 90 100
SURVIVAL FUNCTION PANELIST YACHIN
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0 '
20 30 40 50
-*- NAF
-WlPO
60 70 80 90 100
Days
The Market for Private Dispute Resolution Services
SURVIVAL FUNCTION PANELIST CARMODY
-NAF
-a-WIPO
-- eRas
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1 _
0
20 30 40 50
Days
60 70 80
TABLE i6
COMPARISON OF PANELISTS ACROSS PROVIDERS
Buchele, J. Carmody, J. Kalina, H. Yachnin, R.
Probability WIPO NAF Diff, WIPO NAF Diff. WIPO NAF Diff. WIPO NAF Diff.
0.9 28 27 1 29 25 4 30 27 3 24 23 1
0.7 32 29 3 32 28 4 33 30 3 31 28 3
0.5 38 31 7 38 31 7 35 33 2 34 30 4
0.3 43 33 10 42 33 9 41 35 6 3732 5
0.1 50 38 12 55 40 15 48 39 9 43 35 8
2. Default
Many respondents fail to respond to the providers and also fail to de-
fend themselves from complainants' claims, thus making it easier for the
panel to give a verdict favoring the complainant. The absence of documen-
tation from the respondent challenging the complainant's allegations
makes it simpler for the panelists to evaluate such cases. Consequently, we
found that the duration in these cases is much lower than for other cases.
In each regression, except for CPR, the cases in default were important to
the explanation for the duration function of the respective provider. In this
section, we analyze whether a given case that is in default yields a
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different duration depending on the provider. This analysis should produce
further evidence of fundamental structural differences among providers.
Table 17 illustrates the expected duration of cases where the respon-
dent is in default and also shows the different survival probabilities. NAF
is still faster than WIPO and eRes, and eRes is faster than WIPO. Addi-
tionally, as the probability of survival decreases, the difference in expected
duration increases between NAF and WIPO, NAF and eRes, and eRes and
WIPO. Accordingly, this result reinforces our previous analysis and con-
clusions that the providers have structural differences among them.
3. Type of Panels
Another main issue surrounding the UDRP debate is the type of
panels that should be put in place. Currently there are two types of pan-
els, single member panels and three member panels. According to Geist,
the bias of the UDRP that favors complainants could be solved by sim-
ply changing to a general three member panel system and abandoning
the one member panel. In this section we evaluate the efficiency implica-
tions of such a change, i.e., the impact of having three member panels in
the UDRP system on the duration of the process. Accordingly, we test
the duration function, using a Kaplan-Meyer estimator for those cases
with three member panels as compared with those with one member
panels. Figure 19 shows both duration functions.
TABLE 17
Cases in Default Across Providers
Percentage
Probability WIPO NAF eRes DifWIPO-NAF DifWIPO-eRes Dif eRes-NAF Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(1)-(2) (5=(1)-(3) (6)=(3)-(2) (4)/(1) (5)/(1) (6)/(3)
0.9 36 26 30 10 6 4 27.8 16.7 13.3
0.7 42 30 37 12 5 7 28.6 11.9 18.9
0.5 48 33 40 15 8 7 31.3 16.7 17.5
0.3 57 37 46 20 11 9 35.1 19.3 19.6
0.1 76 42 56 34 20 14 44.7 26.3 25.0
Cases That Are Not in Default
Percentage
Probability WIPO NAF eRes Dif WIPO-NAF Dif WPO-eRes DifeRes-NAF Difference
0.9 36 27 34 9 2 7 25.0 5.6 20.6
0.7 44 34 41 10 3 7 22.7 6.8 17.1
0.5 53 37 45 16 8 8 30.2 15.1 17.8
0.3 64 42 55 22 9 13 34.4 14.1 23.6
0.1 92 55 71 37 21 16 40.2 22.8 22.5
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FIGURE 19
SURVIVAL FUNCTION BY TYPE OF PANEL
--- Three Member Panel
Shg e Member Pane
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Days
TABLE I8
Log-rank Test for Equality of
Survivor Functions
Events
Type p Observed Expected
0 271 293.68
1 2681 2658.32
Total 2952 2952
chi2(1)= 2.04
Pr>chi2 = 0.1527
Cox Regression-Based Test for Equality of Survival Curves
Events Relative
Type p Observed Expected Hazard
0 29 293.68 0.9228
1 26 2658.32 1.0089
Total 2952? 2952 1
LR chi2(1) = 2.00
Pr>chi2 = 0.1573
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As the results indicate, there is almost no change between the dura-
tion curves. Also, the duration for the three member panels seems to be
slightly above the mean duration for single member panels.
Table 18 shows the log-normal and Cox tests of survival functions.
These tests suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that both
duration functions are the same. As a result, duration does not decline
merely as a result of changing from the actual system to one in which
only three member panels are allowed. Therefore, changing to three
member panels could promote the system's fairness without compromis-
ing efficiency.
V. RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
FOR OTHER ADR INITIATIVES
The implementation of the UDRP regime and its wide application to
a number of jurisdictions and countries has prompted attempts to trans-
plant this regime to other types of disputes, both within and outside
Internet markets. Nonetheless, there are several problems that should be
addressed in order to ensure that ICANN's UDRP remains a model dis-
pute resolution regime for both Internet and other markets.
The regression analysis in the previous sections provides several in-
sights and general observations about the UDRP system. First, the
system is not as homogeneous as ICANN has consistently maintained.
Even though the providers have the same stringent rules for every case,
our duration model suggests that the providers have significantly differ-
ent system and technology functions, causing differences in
performance. Accordingly, these differences give rise to the possibility of
forum shopping by complainants. This possibility is reinforced by the
fact that the two most popular providers are located at the extremes of
technological diversity, polarizing the supply of dispute resolution ser-
vices. Other less significant providers, who adjudicate fewer cases, are
located somewhere in between. The variation in performance is also re-
inforced by different factors and variables that determine the different
behaviors between these providers. As a result, complainants will choose
a provider according to the importance they attach to the different factors
which influence their decision.
Further standardization of the general procedures for handling and
deciding claims can probably solve the problems caused by extreme dif-
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ferences among providers.'97 On the other hand, if the current system
remains, the market demand for short duration cases could drive down
the number of cases handled by WIPO. NAF's share of cases would sub-
sequently increase, thus causing WIPO to improve its performance.
Cases in which the respondent is in default have a direct impact on
reducing the general duration of cases.' 9 The amount and quality of the
evidence presented by the complainants and respondents have an impact
on the performance of the providers. Interestingly, even though WIPO
and NAF have been accused of favoring complainants, they are the pro-
viders that are most affected by complainants' evidence. Conversely,
eRes, recognized as being more favorable to respondents, is strongly
affected by the evidence presented by the respondents. The results ob-
tained with respect to the source of law are important in the sense that
the providers are paying attention to the procedural and substantive
compliance by both complainants and providers with the general rules
established by ICANN. This compliance determines the provider per-
formance.
Cases with split decisions also influence WIPO's and CPR's proce-
dures. Although the results are different for both providers, CPR's results
are more consistent with the expected results.' 99 For eRes, there are other
two factors affecting duration. First, cases are solved faster when the
respondent is an employee of the complainant. Second, in cases when
the panel decided to change the domain name, the duration was also
shorter. These two effects are likely to be the result of characteristics
other than incentives.
By designing this system for the Internet, the UDRP's creators
hoped to avoid geographical biases. Despite this planning, the UDRP
providers are still susceptible to such bias. For WIPO, there is a bias to-
ward the United States, Canada, India, and Switzerland. For NAF, the
bias is toward Germany, North America (the U.S. principally), and Rus-
sia. CPR has a bias for Asian complainants and respondents. Finally,
eRes has a bias for those cases where the complainant is from Canada.
Each provider's bias can be attributable to many different causes.
WIPO's headquarters is located in Switzerland, a fact that can explain
197. For example, the extra fees that NAF charges in order to generate an incentive to
promote short responses and complaints and to reduce the total length of the case could be
increased.
198. The duration is not the same for all providers, thus supporting the claim that the
providers are structurally different.
199. The cases in which the panel could not makc a definitive decision should be more
difficult to solve and should take longer to solve.
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the bias for parties from this country. NAF is located in the United States
and it is biased toward North American complainants. CPR, with head-
quarters in Asia, naturally has a bias for Asian complainants and
respondents. Finally, eRes' headquarters in Quebec, Canada, explains the
bias toward Canadian complainants.
Location greatly affects each of the main providers. This geographi-
cal bias suggests that the UDRP could be ill-equipped to handle cases
arising from places where the rules and institutions are different from the
provider's location. Furthermore, bias could be prejudicial for complain-
ants or respondents facing a case against a party coming from one of the
countries that is favored by the provider. The solution to this problem is
not easy because the diversity of the panelists does not necessarily im-
prove the situation. For example, although WIPO is the provider with the
greatest panelist diversity, WIPO is also the provider biased towards the
highest number of countries. It could be that the introduction of new re-
gional providers, as in the case of the new Asian provider, is a solution to
this problem. Accordingly, the creation of regional providers could de-
crease the bias for some countries and improve the efficiency of the
system. Nonetheless, some rules and procedures should be provided for
cases where the parties are from diverse regions.
Some panelists depart from the general performance observed in the
rest of the cases under a given provider. This could be a problem if these
panelists had a behavior completely different from other panelists within
a provider who received an important number of cases. The panelists that
have a different behavior in terms of performance do not have a signifi-
cant effect on the results of the system. Accordingly, the providers are
improving efficiency by favoring these panelists by giving them more
cases to resolve. However, there are some noteworthy differences, such
as bias.toward complainants, among panelists that received a high num-
ber of claims compared to the rest of the panelists.
In conclusion, we show that, even though some panelists have a dif-
ferent performance than the providers they are working for, they are
affected by the structure of the providers. Moreover, although three
member panels are as efficient as single member panels, panelists' be-
havior differs depending on the provider for which they work. Therefore,
the system's efficiency could be improved by identifying the characteris-
tics of these panelists that make them different and faster than the rest of
the system. These characteristics could be implemented within the rules
and procedures of the providers, thereby improving the efficiency of the
system as a whole.
The procedural rules should be changed to provide an equitable pro-
cedure for both parties. Because of the well-known pro-complainant
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"bias," the geographic differences and the disparate behavior of panel-
ists, the selection of providers should be independent of the decision of
each party. Therefore, ICANN should introduce a system of assigning
claims to different providers without delegating this task to one of the
parties, in this case, the complainants. This change will not hurt competi-
tion based on prices because there is currently very little price
competition. In addition, here we have competition in a very concen-
trated market because ICANN does not allow any private ADR provider
to participate. Alternatively, in an oligopolistic market, competitors tend
to collude and to compete on the quality of the service, which, in this
case, is based on speed and complainant bias, rather than on prices.
Another change that should be introduced to improve the perform-
ance of the UDRP is increasing the availability of appeals. The parties
should be able to appeal the verdict of any of the providers, thereby pro-
viding a chance to review procedures and outcomes at a lower level.
Even though this change could increase the cost of the service, it is im-
portant for this regime to gain the trust of consumers and the private
sector.
Given the problems and challenges facing the UDRP today, we do
not advocate simply copying these procedures for use in another sector
or for another set of disputes or issues, especially for topics related to
Internet markets.20 Issues about fairness, availability of regional provid-
ers, and the incentives that these private providers face, given the design
of the procedural rules, will tend to undermine people's trust for Internet
markets, instead of enhancing their willingness to participate. Conse-
quently, in order to succeed in implementing private ADR regimes, we
should provide a thorough analysis of the different characteristics that
permit such a regime to provide effective dispute resolution services that
go beyond the simple "fast and cheap" service.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Numerous scholars and commentators have analyzed ICANN's
UDRP regime. Most of these studies have concentrated on the general
empirical results of the system. Using different perspectives, these stud-
ies have generally criticized the UDRP providers for being biased
towards complainants and for leaving the respondents without a fair
200. For example, the implementation of an ADR regime for electronic commerce simi-
lar to the UDRP will produce uneasiness among consumers and businesses engaging in
transactions on the Internet.
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defense. In this paper, we showed that the emphasis of the different em-
pirical studies of this bias problem was also "biased" or at least
incomplete.
The alleged bias of the providers towards the complainants is not the
main variable complainants are looking at in order to decide the most
suitable provider. Instead, complainants seem to regard provider per-
formance as the main concern in choosing a provider. Consequently,
future analyses should pay more attention to the relative performance of
the different UDRP providers. Accordingly, the procedural UDRP rules
should be analyzed not just in terms of bias and fairness, but also in
terms of the incentives the rules generate for the rapid and efficient reso-
lution of claims presented under the UDRP policy. A better
understanding of the UDRP is attainable by paying more attention to the
efficiency and performance indicators of providers and panelists.
Based on our findings about the importance of the UDRP's perform-
ance, we analyzed the procedural structure of each provider. From this
analysis, we identified the procedure's duration as the main indicator of
an efficient system. Accordingly, we used duration models to identify the
different factors that influence provider performance.
Even though the providers consider important factors such as the
evidence provided by the parties, there are still ways to improve the
global performance of the system. First, the providers have different sys-
tems and technologies for resolving cases, thereby creating opportunities
for forum shopping. Despite ICANN's attempts to provide uniform rules
and policies, the providers still have exploitable differences. In general,
we found that NAF is the most efficient provider and WIPO is the least
efficient. The other providers rank somewhere between these two ex-
tremes.
Second, panelists are important. Although some panelists have to-
tally different performance functions than the providers they work for,
the specific rules of each provider affect these differences. The existence
of these different panelists could improve efficiency if they function
more quickly, as is true for WIPO.
Third, because the UDRP is supposed to avoid geographical dis-
crimination and bias by using a standard set of rules across the Internet,
we should find no discrimination in favor of a particular country or re-
gion. However, we find that the UDRP providers are geographically
biased. Specifically, they are more efficient at handling cases from
places where their headquarters are located. This bias could have impor-
tant implications for handling inter-jurisdictional cases. As a result,
splitting UDRP services into regions could be desirable in the event that
this bias is not eliminated in the medium term.
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Finally, we have found that the election of either a single member
panel or three member panels has no effect on the performance of the
dispute resolution system. This suggests that a move to three-member
panels could improve fairness without sacrificing efficiency.
The empirical results presented in this work have significant impli-
cations for the business of designing fair and efficient private dispute
resolution services as a whole. Issues such as the incentives that the
ADR providers face given a specific design for the procedural rules, the
availability of regional dispute resolution providers, concerns about fair-
ness, and cultivating the trust of consumers and businesses in order to
enhance participation are but a few of the considerations that deserve
careful attention when designing effective private dispute resolution sys-
tems.
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APPENDIX A
UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY2"'
A. APPLICABLE DISPUTES. You are required to submit to a mandatory
administrative proceeding in the event that a third party (a "complain-
ant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance with the Rules of
Procedure, that
(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trade-
mark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the do-
main name; and
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad
faith.
In the administrative proceeding, the complainant must prove that
each of these three elements is present.
B. EVIDENCE OF REGISTRATION AND USE IN BAD FAITH. For the pur-
poses of Paragraph 4(a)(iii), the following circumstances, in particular but
without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence
of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have ac-
quired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or
otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant
who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of
that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your docu-
mented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the
owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a
corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pat-
tern of such conduct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose
of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to
attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-
line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complain-
ant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of
your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or
location.
C. HOW TO DEMONSTRATE YOUR RIGHTS TO AND LEGITIMATE IN-
TERESTS IN THE DOMAIN NAME IN RESPONDING TO A COMPLAINT. When
201. At, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.
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you receive a complaint, you should refer to Paragraph 5 of the Rules ofProcedure in determining how your response should be prepared. Any ofthe following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if foundby the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all evidence pre-sented, shall demonstrate your rights or legitimate interests to thedomain name for purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(ii):(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demon-strable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding tothe domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods orservices; or(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have beencommonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired notrademark or service mark rights; or(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of thedomain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divertconsumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
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APPENDIX B
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cmwipo 6907 0.695196 0.058988 0.556604 0.78
Cmeres 3207 0.598404 0.208998 0.25 1
Ldwipo 6907 4.031995 0.16402 3.367296 4.304384
Lderes 3042 3.981898 0.230907 3.684704 4.584968
Cmnafl 6801 0.74789 0.070263 0.553846 0.9
Cmwipol 6801 0.692952 0.05711 0.556604 0.78
Cmeresl 3077 0.575869 0.191426 0.25 1
Ldnafl 6801 3.718587 0.14358 3.328627 4.044888
Ldwipol 6801 4.026402 0.183573 3.367296 4.304384
Lderesl 3077 3.983243 0.228455 3.684704 4.584968
Cwipo 6874 0.697 0.028 0.583 1.000
Ldunaf 6907.000 3.657 0.063 3.234 3.765
Lduwipo 6874.000 3.953 0.157 3.308 4.086
The Market for Private Dispute Resolution Services
APPENDIX C
VARIABLES MUELLER DATABASE
Variable Description
Dependent Duration Duration, in days, of each case
Variable
Type of Unaffiliated No relationship with the complainant
Respondent Licensee Respondent is licensee of the Complainant
Competitor Respondent is competitor
Employee Respondent is an employee
Critic Respondent is a critic
Unknown The status of the respondent is unknown
Type of Response Default The respondent fails to answer to the Provider
Lat Response Respondent is late in his/her response
Panel Decision Transfer Decision favorable to complainant
Dismiss The complaint is dismissed, favorable to
respondent
Terminated The complaint is terminated, without clear result
(maybe there is a private agreement or a court
action)
Name Change The panel forces one of the parties to change
the name of the domain.
Split The decision favored the complainant in some
aspects and the respondent in others.
Judicial Panelists have reviewed other judicial cases
from other courts in the countries of the parties
Country of RespUS (CompUS) Respondent (Complainant) from the United
Respondents States
(Complainants) RespFR (CompFR) Respondent (Complainant) from the United
States
ResAU (CompAU) Respondent (Complainant) from Australia
ResMX (CompMX) Respondent (Complainant) from Mexico
ResSE (CompSE) Respondent (Complainant) from the
Switzerland
ResiN (CompIN) Respondent (Complainant) from India
ResCA (CompCA) Respondent (Complainant) from Canada
ResNZ (CompNZ) Respondent (Complainant) from New Zealand
ResGB (CompGB) Respondent (Complainant) from Great Britain
ResJP (CompJP) Respondent (Complainant) from Japan
ResBE (CompBE) Respondent (Complainant) from Belgium
ResDE (CompDE) Respondent (Complainant) from Germany
ResIT (CompIT) Respondent (Complainant) from Italy
ResES (CompES) Respondent (Complainant) from Spain
ResNL (CompNL) Respondent (Complainant) from Netherlands
ResRU (CompRU) Respondent (Complainant) from Russia
ResCH (CompCH) Respondent (Complainant) from Czech
Republic
Country of ResME (CompME) Respondent (Complainant) from Middle East
Respondents ResNAC (CompNAC) Respondent (Complainant) from North America
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Variable Description
Dependent Duration Duration, in days, of each case
Variable
(Complainants) ResSA (CompSA) Respondent (Complainant) from South America
(continued) ResOC (CompOC) Respondent (Complainant) from Oceania
ResAS (CompAS) Respondent (Complainant) from Asia
ResEU (CompEU) Respondent (Complainant) from Europe
ResAF (CompAF) Respondent (Complainant) from Africa
ICANN Policy Rule 4a(i) Evidence on the Articles of the ICANN policy,
Articles see appendix A.
Rule 4a(ii)
Rule 4a(iii)
Rule 4c(i)
Rule 4c(ii)
Rule 4c(iii)
Rule 4b(i)
Rule 4b(ii)
Rule 4b(iii)
Panelists Panel Type If the panel is single member or a three member
panel
Panelist1 Abbot, F.
Panelist 19 Barker, L.
Panelist 36 Buchele, J.
Panelist 41 Carmody, J.
Panelist 63 Donahey, M
Panelist 64 Dorf, P.
Panelist 113 Johnson, C.
Panelist 114 Kalina, H.
Panelist 217 Yachnin, R.
Panelist 180 Samuels, J.
Panelist 162 Page,R.
Panelist 134 Limbury, A.
Panelist 79 Foster, D.
Panelist 27 Bianchi, R.
Panelist 24 Bernstein
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APPENDIX D
COX SEMI-PARAMETRIC DURATION MODEL
WITHOUT STRATIFICATION
WIPO NAF
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient
Default 1.234 Default 1.355
(0.05748) (0.08893)
Split 0.556 Respru 2.565
(0.12954) (0.78246)
Respus 0.898 Compde 2.479
(0.04594) (1.76767)
Respse 1.703 Compnac 3.500
(0.35442) (2.02836)
Compus 0.892 Complaw 1.117
(0.04641) (0.04553)
Compse 1.601
(0.30560)
Compin 0.693
(0.11144)
Compca 1.542
(0.26687)
Judicial 1.076
(0.04162)
Buchele, J. 3.523 Buchele, J. 2.640
(0.76310) (0.40042)
Carmody, J. 3.666 Carmody, J. 2.970
(0.53735) (0.313959)
Dofr, P 2.583
(0.51499)
Johnson, C. 3.310
(0.41969)
Kalina, H. 3.068 Kalina, H. 2.135
(0.63650) (0.38243)
Yachnin, R. 4.829 Yachnin, R. 3.124
(1.10124) (0.417072)
Limbury, A. 1.756
(0.33117)
Bernstein 0.690
(0.11368)
Nr Observations 1996 1119
Nr Failures 1996 1119
Time at risk 114471 43313
Wald Chi2(df) 135.8 156.61
(df=12) (df=7)
Probability Chi2 0.000 0.000
Log Likelihood -12292.70 -6141.25
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TEST OF PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS AssuMPTION
WIPO NAF eRes CPR
Rho Chi2 Prob Rho Chi2 Prob Rho Chi2 Prob Rho Chi2 Prob
efaull 0.038 2.97 0.088 Default -0.013 0.20 0.652 efault 0.005 0.00 0.946 plit 0.071 0.32 0.574
0I
plft 0.014 0.40 0.527 Respru 0.012 0.17 0.682 Employee -0.080 1.49 0.223 mp 0.059 0.19 0.661
espus 0.001 0.00 0.955 ,ompde 0.018 0.37 0.541 Namecan -0.015 0.04 0.846 resp 0.096 0.30 0.582
espse 0.017 0.51 0.474 ompnac -0.006 0.04 0.842 espciii -0.022 0.11 0.744
mpus -0.004 0.04 0.842 Oomplaw -0.027 0.88 0.348 mpca 0.079 1.09 0296
ompse -0.020 0.74 0.389
;ompin 0.014 0.39 0.533
ompca -0.007 0.08 0.772
ludicial -0.007 0.12 0.732
3uchele, J. -0.037 2.71 0.099 Buchele, -0.017 0.31 0.577 Buchele, -0.002 0.00 0.987 Buchele, 0.089 0.36 0.549
J. J
Carmody, J. -0.064 8.12 0.004 Carmody, -0.134 19.28 0.000 ody, -0.001 0.00 0.993
3.
Dorf, P. -0.031 1.96 0.161
Johnson, C. -0.062 7.64 0.006
<ana, H. -0.116 27.17 0.000 Kalina, H. 0.016 0.30 0.582
fachnin, R. -0.101 20A. 0.000 Yachrin, -0232 62.48 0.000 achnin, -0.028 0.07 0.793
R. R.
imbury, A. -0.017 0.58 0.447
mstein 0.027 1.47 0.225
.obal test 68.32 0.000 83.24 0.000 2.45 0.984 0.40 0.983
TEST OF PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS ASSUMPTION, STRATIFIED MODELS
WIPO NAF
Rho Chf Prob Rho Chf Prob
Default 0.032 2.10 0.147 Default -0.010 0.10 0.747
Split 0.025 0.73 0.394 Respru 0.015 0.09 0.771
Respus -0.001 0.00 0.948 Compde 0.011 0.07 0.794
Respse 0.018 0.65 0.419 Compnac 0.001 0.00 0.980
Compus -0.002 0.01 0.937 Complaw -0.025 0.63 0.429
Compse -0.024 1.49 0.222
Compin 0.017 0.48 0.488
Compca -0.005 0.04 0.839
Judicial -0.005 0.04 0.839
Buchele, J. Buchele, J. -0.009 0.11 0.743
Carmody, J. Carmody, J.
Dof, P. -0.030 3.19 0.074
Johnson, C.
Kalina, H. Kalina, H. 0.027 0.44 0.507
Yachnin, R. Yachnin, R.
Limbury, A. -0.016 0.69 0.406
Bernstein 0.029 0.98 0.321
Global test 9.06 0.939 1.69 0.996
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NAF: COX-SNELLS RESIDUALS TEST OF FIT
3 4 5 6
Cox-Snell Residuals
WIPO: COX-SNELLS RESIDUALS TEST OF FIT
Cumulative Hazard
Cox-Snell Residuals
2 3 4
Cox Snell Residual
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CPR: COX-SNELLS RESIDUALS TEST OF FIT
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ERES: COX-SNELLS RESIDUALS TEST OF FIT
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